Published October 30-November 5, 2026
How brands can turn forgotten customer databases into living, profitable audiences, without paying to send another email.
Every brand owns a database it has stopped operating. This essay is about who should operate it, on what terms, and why only a portfolio can make it pay.
The argument in one line. A dormant database is not a dead asset; it is an unoperated one. What is uneconomic for one brand to operate can become profitable when a shared platform operates it for a hundred brands: recovering customers at no charge to the brand, earning media revenue from the attention it restores, and taking a share of transaction uplift only where it can prove it.
I
The Graveyard in Every Database
1 The silent majority
The brand paid to build the database, and then stopped operating it.
Every large consumer brand owns a graveyard. It sits inside the customer database: millions of email addresses collected over years of advertising, registrations, purchases and loyalty sign-ups. Each one cost money to acquire. Each one belonged to someone who, at some point, had a reason to engage. Then, gradually and without any single moment anyone could point to, the relationship went quiet.
Marketing calls these customers dormant. The term is polite. It means the brand has stopped expecting anything from them. They have not unsubscribed. Their addresses have not bounced. They simply stopped opening, and the brand responded by sending them less, then nothing, then forgetting they were there. In a mature database it is rarely a fringe, and it is often a large share of the list.
The accounting is strange. Finance rarely gives dormant customer attention any separately measurable value, because it produces no revenue anyone can point to. Deliverability teams treat it as a hazard, because sending to unresponsive addresses damages the sender reputation that the active programme depends on. And the acquisition team, under pressure to grow, goes back to Google and Meta to find customers. Some of the people it pays to reach are already in the database. The brand is buying back, at auction prices, attention it once owned and let lapse. That is the reacquisition tax: the share of marketing spend that goes to winning back customers the brand already had.
So the dormant half sits in an odd position. It is too risky to email, too valuable to delete and too quiet to count. Nobody owns it. The CRM team’s targets are built on the responsive base. The acquisition team’s targets are built on new customers, and a dormant customer it reacquires looks, on its dashboard, like a new one. The dormant half falls between two budgets and belongs to neither.
This essay argues that the problem is not the asset. It is the economics of operating that asset one brand at a time. It takes its frame from an unlikely place: a Milan-based software company that has built a business valued at about $18 billion at its July 2026 listing, and above $33 billion after Berkshire Hathaway added to its stake this month, by taking over products that other people had stopped running well.
2 A database is not an audience
A dormant list is not an audience. It is the raw material for one.
Start with a distinction that most marketing dashboards blur. A database is a list of addresses the brand is permitted to email. An audience is the set of people who will pay attention when it does. The first is an accounting asset. The second is an attention asset. Real Reach measures the gap between them: the number of customers who have engaged in the last ninety days, set against the size of the list.
Consider an illustrative brand with ten million addresses. Two million read its email with some regularity. Three million are fading: they still open occasionally, but less often than last year. Five million have not engaged in months. The brand’s list says ten million. Its Real Reach says two.
Figure 1. The accounting asset and the attention asset. Illustrative split, not a market estimate.
This matters because almost every email metric is computed against the wrong denominator. Open rates and click rates are reported on sends, so a brand that stops emailing its dormant half looks healthier, not weaker. The list stays large, the rates improve, and nobody sees that the attention asset is shrinking.
It is also worth being precise about what the dormant half contains. It is not an audience waiting to be switched back on. Some of those people no longer need the category. Some have moved to a competitor. Some addresses have been abandoned, and a few have been recycled into traps that mailbox providers use to catch careless senders. Some customers withdrew their permission in spirit long ago, even if they never clicked unsubscribe. A dormant list contains a potential audience, mixed with addresses that should never be emailed again.
That is why the argument has to be made carefully. The opportunity is not to email the dormant half. It is to find the part of it that can still become an audience, earn that audience back, and leave the rest alone. Doing that well is expensive, and the expense is the reason almost no brand does it.
II
Why Brands Abandon the Dormant Half
3 The cost is not the send
The dormant half is not abandoned because it is worthless, but because it is expensive to operate alone.
The obvious explanation for why brands neglect dormant customers is that emailing them costs money. It is the wrong explanation. On modern infrastructure, the marginal cost of sending an email is a small fraction of a cent. A brand could email its entire dormant half every week for less than it spends on a single day of paid search.
The real cost is producing something worth opening. A dormant customer has already ignored months of the brand’s promotions. Another discount, another new arrival, another “we miss you” will not change that. What might change it is something the customer values for its own sake: a useful piece of content, a small game, a question worth answering, an object worth keeping. Producing that every week, for an audience that is not currently buying, needs an editorial team, a games studio and a content operation. No CRM team has these, and no CMO can justify building them for customers who generate no revenue.
The second cost is risk. Sending to unresponsive addresses is the fastest way to damage a sender’s reputation with the large mailbox providers, and that reputation is shared with the active programme that pays the bills. A brand that mails its dormant half carelessly can find its promotional email landing in spam for everyone. Mailbox providers have tightened their rules for bulk senders, and the complaint thresholds they tolerate are low. From the CRM team’s seat, the dormant half is not an opportunity. It is a threat to the part of the database that works.
So the rational decision for any single brand is to leave the dormant half alone and pay to reacquire whoever comes back. It is rational for the brand. It is wasteful for the system.
A dormant audience needs a publisher, not another campaign. Look closer and the problem breaks into four obstacles, each of which a single brand struggles to clear.
The first is content. The dormant customer needs a reason to open that has nothing to do with selling. That is a publishing problem: a recurring edition with something worth reading, something worth doing and something worth keeping. I described this format in The Brand Digest: Email’s Missing Publication. Brands are not publishers, and their CRM teams are measured on campaigns, not editions.
The second is the sending domain. Any serious attempt to reach dormant customers needs isolated sending, careful volume ramps, validation before every send, suppression of addresses that should not be contacted, and an automatic stop tied to complaint rates. These are specialist disciplines. Getting them wrong once can cost a brand months of deliverability.
The third is monetisation. Even when a brand restores attention, it has no way to earn from it between purchases. Commerce media networks have shown that verified attention close to intent is valuable to advertisers, but building an advertising sales operation to monetise a few hundred thousand re-engaged readers makes no sense for one brand. The attention would be restored, and then left idle again.
The fourth is measurement. The industry’s default signal of attention, the open, has become unreliable. Privacy features in some mail clients pre-load images, and security scanners open emails that no person has seen. A brand that counts opens as reactivation will move machine-opened addresses back into its promotional programme and damage the reputation it set out to protect. Real reactivation needs a verified human action, and a holdout group to show whether that action would have happened anyway.
Each obstacle carries a fixed cost: an editorial operation, a deliverability practice, an advertising sales team, a measurement system. Each can be justified on its own. Together, for one brand’s dormant customers, they fail the budget meeting. Shared across a hundred brands, each becomes small. That is the opening the rest of this essay is about.
III
What Bending Spoons Teaches
4 The shared platform
Don’t buy the database. Build the factory that makes operating the next one cheaper than the last.
Bending Spoons began in 2013 as a small mobile-app developer and became something else: a company that acquires established digital products and runs them on its own operating machine. It has made more than fifty acquisitions. Its main businesses include Evernote, WeTransfer, Vimeo, Eventbrite and AOL. In September 2026, two months after listing on Nasdaq, it completed its $1.285 billion purchase of Airtable, and within days agreed to buy Miro for $1.355 billion. Many of these products were famous, widely used and under-run. Their users had not left. Their economics had stalled.
The easy reading of Bending Spoons is that it buys bargains. That misses the point. The company describes itself as built on operational excellence: it acquires digital businesses, transforms them, reinvests the earnings and repeats. It keeps what it buys, and says it has never sold a material business. The transformation is the business. Acquired products move onto a common technology platform, common processes and a common way of deciding on pricing, product and cost. Each new product benefits from everything the previous ones taught. The machine is the asset; the products are what it operates.
That is the lesson worth taking. A product that is uneconomic for its own management to run well can become profitable inside a machine that runs many such products. The fixed costs of excellence, such as engineering, analytics, pricing expertise and experimentation, are spread across the portfolio. The marginal cost of operating one more product falls with each one added.
Now apply that logic to the dormant half of a brand’s database. One brand cannot justify an editorial team, a games studio, a deliverability practice and an advertising sales operation for customers who are not buying. An operator serving a hundred brands can. What is uneconomic for one brand to operate can become profitable when a shared platform operates it for a hundred. The editorial templates built for one travel brand serve the next. The advertiser who buys an action in one career Digest can buy it across five. The deliverability playbook refined on the first dormant list makes the fiftieth safer.
Applied to attention, the Bending Spoons model is not about buying databases. It is about building the factory that makes each additional database cheaper and quicker to operate than the one before.
Figure 2. The portfolio is operated through one shared machine. The machine is what improves.
5 Where the analogy breaks
The operator runs the asset. It never owns it.
Analogies are useful until they are taken literally, and this one breaks in three places.
First, customers’ consent cannot be bought. Bending Spoons acquires companies outright, along with the user relationships those products hold. No operator can acquire a brand’s customers that way, and none should try. Permission to receive email from a brand is permission given to that brand. The operator’s role is to run the dormant audience on the brand’s behalf, under the brand’s name, inside the brand’s consent, and under data-protection law that holds the brand accountable for what happens. In India, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act frames exactly this relationship.
Second, the brand stays in the room. A Bending Spoons acquisition ends the previous owner’s involvement. Here the brand remains the owner of the customer relationship, the data and the right to stop. It approves the content categories, the advertisers and the limits on cadence. The operator earns the right to rebuild attention. It does not earn the customer.
Third, the analogy carries a warning. Bending Spoons’ acquisitions have often been followed by deep workforce cuts and higher subscription prices, and the company has critics among users of the products it bought. The inbox equivalent of that error is over-monetisation: treating restored attention as inventory to harvest rather than a relationship to keep. An operator that fills a dormant customer’s Digest with advertising will lose that customer a second time, and this time for good. The discipline has to be built into the product: at most one clearly labelled partner action per edition, category exclusions that the brand controls, and a hard stop when complaint rates rise.
With those corrections, the analogy holds where it matters. A portfolio of dormant audiences is operated through one shared machine, and the machine is what improves. Every additional brand should be cheaper to onboard than the last one in its category. If it is not, there is no factory, only a services business with a clever name.
IV
The Attention Factory
6 What the factory makes
The factory’s product is not email. It is the reason to open the next one.
The factory produces four things, and none of them is a promotion.
The first is a publication. The Brand Digest is a short edition from the customer’s world, sent under the brand’s name: a few things worth reading, one thing worth doing and something worth keeping. A travel brand curates places. A jobs platform explains salaries and skills. A grocer explores food. The brand is the editor, not the protagonist. The Digest is useful on a day the reader buys nothing, which is most days.
The second is the Magnet: a thirty-to-sixty-second interaction that leaves the reader better off. A quiz on salary bands in their city. A prediction about a match. A puzzle, a benchmark, or a choice between two places to visit. The Magnet turns reading into participation, and participation into a signal that a real person is present.
The third is the object. A Magnet that leaves nothing behind is a moment, and moments do not form habits. A NeoCard gives the edition something to keep. It arrives by email with a permanent front and a back that can change. It may come with a Magnet, ask for a prediction before it is revealed, or carry a new challenge after it has been collected. Cards form sets, sets fill an album, and yesterday’s collection gives today’s edition another reason to matter. I described this in NeoCards: Objects Worth Keeping.
The fourth is the ledger. Mu, the attention currency, rewards completed actions under clear rules, and the ledger records what each reader has earned. The number in the subject line, the reader’s own balance, is a small promise that this email remembers the last one.
Each of these is expensive to build once and cheap to reuse. A quiz engine, a card system, a Mu ledger and an editorial workflow do not need to be rebuilt for each brand. What changes is the content: the places, the questions, the card designs and the category knowledge. Even content has a shared structure. A career Digest for one jobs platform and a money Digest for one consumer-finance brand draw on the same production line, staffed by editors working with AI and organised by vertical rather than by client.
This is where the portfolio does its work. A single brand would pay the full cost of the studio for one Digest. A hundred brands each pay a hundredth.
7 The way back
An open is a rumour. An action is evidence.
A factory that produces good editions still needs a careful way to introduce them to dormant customers. Sending a dormant list a daily Digest would be the fastest way to damage the domain the brand depends on. So the way back has two programmes, not one.
The first is Recover: a short, time-boxed sequence of lighter editions, called Minis, sent only to addresses that pass eligibility checks. They must be validated, unsuppressed and inside consent. Each Mini carries one strong reason to engage: a new card to collect, one question worth answering, or, where the brand has issued Mu before, a balance the reader had forgotten. The sequence ends with a hard exit rule. Readers who take no action by the end are suppressed. A dormant customer never receives open-ended Digest cadence. I set out the reasoning for this rule in 10+1 Email Innovations.
The way back then has three stages, in a fixed order. Recover finds the people who respond. An open inside Recover is logged as attention detected, but it changes nothing, because machines can generate opens. Graduation requires a verified human action: a Magnet answered, a card collected through a real interaction, a purposeful click or a stated preference. Graduation does two things. It returns the reader to the brand’s own marketing programme, at no charge. And it unlocks the Standard Digest, at a cadence the reader chooses. Habit is what the Standard Digest is then meant to produce: repeated, voluntary engagement, measured by Habit Rate, the share of readers who open at least 60% of the editions they chose over four weeks. Because opens are noisy, Habit Rate counts estimated human opens, with machine opens filtered out, and is checked against clicks, interactions and repeated returns.
The order matters. Reactivation qualifies a reader for the Digest. Habit is the Digest’s result, not its entry ticket.
Figure 3. Recover, Graduate, Habit. An open is never enough to graduate, and habit is earned inside the Digest.
Every Recover programme runs with a randomised holdout from the first day: a slice of the eligible dormant cohort that receives nothing. The holdout answers the question every brand should ask: how many of these customers would have come back anyway? Reactivation is counted as the difference between the two groups, never as the raw number in the treated group. Dormant cohorts allow a cleaner test than almost anything else in marketing, because the control group is drawn from the same people at the same time and left alone.
Recover is the bridge. It is deliberately narrow, short and suspicious of easy signals. Its job is to find the part of the dormant half that can still become an audience. The Digest’s job is to keep it. I described why customer retention begins with attention retention in Before the Slide.
V
The New Bargain
8 Operating, not owning
The brand keeps the customer. The operator earns the right to rebuild the attention.
The commercial relationship needs a name that does not alarm a legal team. “Renting the database” is vivid and wrong. It implies that the operator receives the brand’s customers as a third party, to use for its own purposes. A better term is Audience Operating Rights: a contract under which the operator runs the dormant audience for the brand, as the brand’s processor, under defined permissions.
The terms follow from that. The brand remains the data controller and the owner of the relationship. It keeps control of consent, suppression and the right to stop sending at any time. Emails go out under the brand’s name, from isolated sending infrastructure that protects the reputation of its main domain, with volume caps and an automatic pause if complaints rise. The brand approves the advertising categories and can exclude competitors and anything it considers unsuitable.
The operator, in turn, funds the work: the sending, the editorial production, the Magnets and cards, the technology and the operations. Because it invests before it earns, it needs a defined operating term, long enough to recover the cost of rebuilding attention. Twelve months, renewable, is a reasonable starting point, with a fair settlement if the brand ends the arrangement early.
Two lines must not be crossed. Permission to receive a brand’s email is not permission for the operator to profile that customer across brands, or to market its own products to them. And the operator acquires no lasting claim on the brand’s customers. Anything that extends beyond the brand, such as a reader’s choice to carry their cards into a wider album shared with other brands, has to be the reader’s own explicit and separate decision. And no commercial term overrides the reader: an unsubscribe or a withdrawal of consent ends the relationship, whatever the contract says. The bargain works only if the brand never has reason to wonder whose customer it is.
9 Two meters
The brand pays nothing to get its customers back, and pays only when they buy more than the control group did.
The economics of the bargain run on two meters. They are best kept as separate entitlements, so that the front door stays simple.
The first is the attention meter. Recovery is free. Sending is ZeroCPM: the brand pays nothing per email. Once readers have graduated to the Standard Digest, each edition can carry one clearly labelled ActionAd: a partner action completed inside the email, such as a sign-up, a quote, a sample or a booking. Net ActionAd revenue, meaning gross advertiser payments less third-party fees and refunds, is split 50:50 between the brand and the operator. The operator pays its costs from its own half, so the brand’s half needs no reconciliation of anyone’s internal costs.
The second is the transaction meter, contracted separately and optional. When restored attention leads to purchases, the holdout shows how many of them are incremental. The operator can then be paid a share of the lift above the control group, never of the baseline, on an agreed economic basis such as contribution profit. In NeoMarketing’s terms, the baseline is Beta, the verified improvement is Alpha, and the operator’s agreed share of it is Carry. No lift, no bill. This is the model I described in No Lift, No Bill: How Progency Works.
Figure 4. One customer journey, two commercial meters.
The order matters in the sales conversation. A brand’s first reason to agree is recovered customers at no charge. The advertising share is a second benefit and an alignment mechanism: the operator earns only when the attention it restores is valuable to someone. The transaction meter can follow once the holdout has produced evidence.
The two meters also keep apart two claims that are easy to blur. Recovered attention is one claim: a reader who was silent now acts. Avoided reacquisition is another: the brand did not have to buy that customer back through paid media. The holdout proves the first as soon as readers graduate. The second is proven only when recovered customers go on to buy through the brand’s own channels at a higher rate than the control group, and the brand’s REACQ%, the share of its customers re-bought from paid channels, falls. A customer who answers a Magnet has not yet saved the brand anything. The operator should claim the first when it happens, and the second only when the evidence arrives.
Together, the two meters restate the Three NEVERs in commercial form. A dormant customer whose attention is restored is a customer the brand did not lose: Never Lose Customers. A customer who goes on to buy through the brand’s own channel, rather than through an ad, is one the brand did not pay Google or Meta to buy back: Never Pay Twice. The arrangement does not end paid acquisition; it changes the order in which a brand spends. And a brand that pays nothing to send, and pays for transactions only on proven lift, has no fixed fee anywhere in the arrangement: Never Pay Fixed.
VI
The Economics, Without the Gloss
10 One brand is a rounding error
The portfolio creates the operating advantage. Yield decides the prize.
It is easy to make this model sound richer than it is. So take an illustrative brand and follow the money.
The brand has two million dormant addresses. After validation and suppression, 1.4 million are eligible for Recover. A four-Mini sequence sends 5.6 million emails. Five per cent of eligible readers take a verified action and graduate: 70,000 readers. Each receives about 13 Digests a month, and a person engages with 35% of those editions, which gives about 318,500 engaged editions a month.
Now the yield. Suppose each engaged edition offers one ActionAd, 1.5% of them are completed, and the average advertiser payout is $0.40 per action. That is $6 of net revenue per 1,000 engaged editions: about $1,900 a month in total, and about $950 a month to each party. At the operator’s own infrastructure cost of around $0.20 per thousand emails, sending is cheap: roughly $1,100 for the whole Recover sequence and under $200 a month for the Digests.
Delivery is cheap. Audience creation is not. Editorial production, card design, data work, brand onboarding, advertising sales, support and measurement all cost more than the sending, and they come before the revenue. The economic test is recovering the whole investment, not the cost of the emails. As a standalone media property, one brand’s dormant half is a rounding error.
Scale changes the picture, but less than intuition suggests. A hundred such brands would hold about seven million graduated readers and produce about $1.15 million a year in advertising revenue for the operator at the same yield. That is a business line, not a company. If net yield reaches $30 per 1,000 engaged editions, which lead-generation categories may support, the same portfolio produces about $5.7 million a year. Yield, not database size, decides which of these futures arrives.
Figure 5. Illustrative. Per brand: 70,000 graduated readers, 13 editions a month, 35% engaged; operator keeps 50% of net ActionAd revenue.
There is a second number in the illustration, and it matters more to the brand. If one in ten of the 70,000 graduated readers buys within ninety days, at an average order of $30, those customers spend $210,000 in a quarter. Not all of that is incremental; the holdout decides how much. But even a modest incremental share is worth more to the brand than a year of its advertising share. That is why the pitch leads with recovered customers, and why the transaction meter may matter more than the attention meter in many categories.
If the hundredth brand costs as much to operate as the first, there is no factory. That is the test the portfolio must pass, and the operator’s equation shows where. It is simple to write. Contribution equals half of net advertising revenue, plus any transaction share, minus delivery, content, operations and the cost of Mu, with the initial recovery investment repaid over the life of a graduated reader. Four numbers show whether it works.
The first is contribution per 1,000 graduated readers per month. It strips out the size of the database and shows whether a restored reader pays for being kept.
The second is recovery cost per graduate: what it costs, including content and sending, to turn one dormant address into one verified reader.
The third is payback: how many months of contribution it takes to recover that cost. A twelve-month operating term works only if payback falls well inside it.
The fourth, and the one that tests the Bending Spoons thesis directly, is marginal contribution per additional brand. If the factory works, each new brand in a category should cost less to onboard, need less new editorial work and reach advertisers who already buy elsewhere in the portfolio. The tenth travel brand should be cheaper to operate than the second.
These numbers also show where the levers are. Recovery rate determines how many readers the factory gets. Habit Rate determines how long it keeps them. Yield determines what each engaged edition earns. Shared production determines what each edition costs. I set out a similar four-lever equation in How Publishers Can 10X Their Revenue; the same logic applies here, with the dormant half as the starting audience.
The choice of brands follows from the levers. The age of dormancy matters less than four other questions: whether the brand holds legitimate permission, whether its dormant customers are plausibly recoverable, whether advertisers want to reach its category, and whether its world naturally produces a recurring Digest and collectible sets. Jobs, travel, lifestyle, entertainment and some retail categories pass all four. Banking, where third-party advertising and reward currencies face regulatory limits, does not, and needs a compliance-first version of the Digest.
VII
What Would Prove This Wrong, and What Follows
11 Five kill conditions
The crux is whether one recovered reader generates enough recurring, monetisable attention to pay for bringing them back.
A business thesis that cannot be wrong is not worth much. This one can be wrong in five specific ways, and each can be tested within ninety days on a handful of brands.
It fails if verified recovery against the holdout is close to zero. If the dormant customers who take an action are the ones who would have come back anyway, the operator is claiming credit for natural return, and the brand will eventually notice.
It fails if Habit Rate collapses after Recover. A reader who answers one Magnet and never returns is a reactivation statistic, not an audience. The model needs graduates who keep reading.
It fails if net yield cannot cover editorial and delivery costs, even at portfolio scale. If advertisers will not pay meaningfully for actions inside restored relationships, the attention meter cannot fund the factory, and the model survives only as a recovery service paid on transaction lift.
It fails if complaint rates threaten sender reputation. A model that endangers the brand’s main domain will be switched off, and should be.
And it fails if the marginal cost of each additional brand does not fall. Without that, the operator has built an agency with a media story, not a factory, and the Bending Spoons comparison is decoration.
The ninety-day test is designed around these conditions, with every threshold set before the first message is sent. A handful of brands, chosen for permission, recoverability, advertiser demand and Digest fit. A randomised holdout in each. A time-boxed Recover sequence, followed by a reader-chosen Standard Digest. A test of whether a single, contextually relevant partner action inside Recover helps or harms reactivation, judged on complaints, verified recovery and later habit. And a gate at day ninety that scales the programme only if recovery, habit, yield, complaint rates and contribution all clear their thresholds. I would also watch whether readers keep and revisit their cards, as an early sign of the consumer opportunity, without mistaking it for revenue.
12 From databases to audiences
The next great media businesses may not begin by acquiring audiences. They may begin by restoring attention to the audiences brands have already paid for.
If the factory works, it does not stay a factory. A hundred operated audiences become a network. Advertisers that buy actions in one Digest can buy across a category. A dormant customer of one brand, unreachable in its own emails, may be an active reader of another brand’s Digest, where a one-tap invitation can bring them back. I described the shape of this network in Inbox Media Network: How the Next Ad Category Has Been Hiding in Plain Sight. What this essay adds is the operating model: who runs the inventory, on what terms, and why only a portfolio can afford to.
The consumer side can compound too. A reader who collects cards from one brand may, by their own choice, carry them into an album shared across several. That album could become a reason to open email that belongs to no single brand, and an asset that grows with every issuer. It must rest on explicit opt-in, and it cannot be funded indefinitely by a loss-making business-to-business operation. Its economics have to stand on their own.
Inside NeoMarketing, this is Atrium’s operating model: a portfolio operator of dormant audiences, with Progency providing the transaction meter. It does not need a new name. It needs the factory built and the ninety-day test run.
The old email industry was paid to send. The next one may be paid to bring customers back, and to keep them coming back. The dormant half of every database is the largest pool of known, permissioned and idle attention in marketing. It has sat idle not because it was worthless, but because no single brand could afford to operate it. A shared factory can.
Don’t buy the database. Build the factory that makes operating the next one cheaper than the last.