Thinks 2148

FT: “[The] protein boom that is reshaping the food industry. From dairy co-operatives to meat processors, companies are extracting more valuable ingredients from materials they once sold cheaply, while food manufacturers compete to secure supplies. The appetite for protein is driving billions in factory investments and acquisitions. “Protein is increasingly [dictating] what food companies produce, where they invest capital, and how they differentiate and grow,” says Brian Earnest, lead animal protein economist at agribusiness lender CoBank. Yet the commercial enthusiasm rests on a proposition that nutrition scientists question: that eating more protein necessarily means eating better. While some groups may benefit from increasing their intake, researchers say protein deficiency is rare in countries such as the US. They warn that the pursuit of one essential nutrient to excess can crowd others out of people’s diets.”

Azeem Azhar: “What is the demand for those chips to do the computing that, in some cases — most cases — produces tokens? And who are the customers of those GPUs? And when we look at this, we see these hyperscalers — Amazon, Microsoft and Google — and then new labs called neoclouds. These people buy millions of these GPUs. They put them together in data centers that will now start to cost billions of dollars, and they rent those GPUs out. And the thing that I spend a lot of time thinking about is: Is that capital expenditure on the actual productive asset turning into revenue with just enough return on investment to pay itself? And right now, the reason we know we’re in a compute-constrained environment is that people are making extremely good returns in 18 to 24 months on an asset because they’re able to charge essentially Uber surge pricing for their GPUs. And about 50 percent of their revenues go to the two big A.I. companies, Anthropic and OpenAI, for their spending.”

NYTimes: “A.I. is also creating a new type of work that may be sucking up much of the time the technology itself is saving. Call it a “verification tax,” “botsitting” or “rework” — it’s the often arduous task of checking that A.I. output is accurate, safe and usable, and it is putting a very human bottleneck on A.I. automation. “The binding constraint on growth is no longer intelligence,” Christian Catalini, a research associate and lecturer at M.I.T. Sloan, wrote in a February working paper. “It is human verification bandwidth.” In other words, Catalini told DealBook, “the only A.I. that’s useful is the A.I. that is verified.””

Benjamin Bratton and others: “Today, the best AI agents for many applications are not single models, but frameworks that use division of labor to harness multiple models into teams. This suggests that AGI may arrive not as a single general-purpose mind, but rather through societies of agents whose collective capacities exceed those of any one model. If so, AGI would not be achieved via any one “winning” architecture; it would emerge instead through cooperative interactions among models, tools, institutions, and human participants.” [via Arnold Kling]

Martech: The Moat Is the Loop

Learn Across Brands. Act Within Them. Underwrite the Outcomes.

If AI makes martech features cheap to build and platforms easy to leave, what makes a martech company hard to replace?

The argument in one line. Martech’s old moats were software, integrations, data custody and switching costs, and AI is weakening all four. The new moat is a loop with three parts: learning across brands, acting within each brand, and underwriting the outcomes. Each part can be copied on its own. The loop cannot, because it compounds: every brand served makes the system better at delivering results for the next.

1   The Disappearing Moat

A chief marketing officer is weighing a renewal. Her team has spent six years building journeys, segments, templates and integrations on its customer-engagement platform. The platform works. But a challenger can now reproduce most of what she sees on screen, an AI-assisted migration makes moving less frightening, and her own agents can already prepare campaigns across more than one tool. The incumbent points to its features and to the years of integration work. She asks a simpler question: what do we know now that we would not know without you?

Most martech companies would struggle to answer, because their customers have stayed for a different reason. Ask anyone who has run one why customers stay, and if they are candid the answer will not be about affection. Customers stay because leaving is hard.

For twenty-five years, four things made a martech platform hard to leave. The first was switching cost: years of templates, journeys, segments and campaign logic built inside one tool, none of it portable. The second was integration: the platform was wired into the brand’s commerce system, its app, its data warehouse, its service desk and its analytics, and every wire was a reason not to move. The third was custody of customer data: profiles, event histories, consent records and preferences lived on the vendor’s servers, and moving them felt like moving house with the furniture nailed to the floor. The fourth was depth of features: a mature platform did hundreds of things, the brand used dozens of them, and any challenger had to match those dozens before it could argue about the rest.

None of these moats was about results. A brand could be disappointed with what its platform delivered and still stay, because the cost of leaving was higher than the cost of disappointment. Vendors knew this, and so did their investors. Net revenue retention, the number the industry watched most closely, measured how well a platform kept and expanded its customers, not whether those customers were better off.

AI is weakening all four moats at once, though it is not eliminating them. Features are cheaper to build: a capability that took a product team a year can now be produced in weeks, and copied in about the same time. Migration is being automated: the templates, journeys and segment definitions that once took months to rebuild can be read, translated and recreated by machines, a shift I described in The Software Foundry series. Integration is becoming routine, as standard connectors and agents that read documentation do in hours what used to take an implementation team weeks. And agents increasingly work across tools rather than inside one. When the marketer’s assistant is an agent that can operate any platform, the platform starts to look like an interchangeable part. Some friction will remain: consent histories, suppression rules and the exceptions nobody documented are still hard to move, and no bank will shift its customer engagement over a weekend because AI can write code. But the direction is clear. Customers will have more credible alternatives, and friction will become a less acceptable reason to stay.

Data custody is weakening too, from a different direction. Brands increasingly keep their customer data in their own warehouses, and the platform reads from it rather than holding it. The vendor that was once the keeper of the customer record is becoming one of several tools with permission to use it.

Old moat What AI is doing to it The better reason to stay
Switching costs Machines read, translate and rebuild templates, journeys and segments Value that grows the longer a brand stays
Integrations Connectors and agents do in hours what took weeks Deployments that get cheaper and safer each time
Data custody Brands keep data in their own warehouses; platforms read it Permissioned learning without custody
Feature depth Features are cheaper to build and copy; agents work across tools Tested judgement about what causes results

Figure 1. The four old moats, what AI is doing to each, and the better reason to stay.

The industry’s response so far has been consolidation. On 20 October 2026, Salesforce agreed to acquire Braze for about $5.66 billion in enterprise value, a little over six times the $910 million or so of revenue Braze expects for its current financial year. The deal still needs shareholder and regulatory approval. It is a sensible combination, and it tells us something. Acquisitions buy capability, talent and customers, and Salesforce is buying a working company with strong engineers and real AI decisioning, not merely a feature list. What an acquisition cannot buy is evidence that the combined company has learned to improve one brand’s incremental profit because it has worked with another. That is not an asset sitting on a balance sheet. It is a process that has to be built, run and proved after the deal closes.

The old martech moat was the cost of leaving. The question for every martech company now is what replaces it.

2   Thousands of Brands, Little Learned

Consider what a large martech platform sees. Thousands of brands across dozens of categories send billions of messages a month through it. Every one of those messages is an experiment of a kind: a choice of customer, offer, channel, timing and words, followed by a response or its absence. No brand, agency or chief marketing officer sees a fraction of this. If experience were measured by the number of marketing decisions observed, the martech platform would be the most experienced company in marketing by a wide margin.

Yet ask a martech company what it knows about what works, and the answer is thin. It can tell you average open rates by industry, the best day of the week to send, and that personalised subject lines tend to beat generic ones. It cannot tell you, with any confidence, which intervention would bring back a lapsed customer of a mid-sized apparel brand who bought twice, last opened an email four months ago, and responded once to free shipping but never to a discount. That is the knowledge a brand needs, and almost nobody has it.

There are four reasons, and none of them is a shortage of data.

The first is the billing meter. Martech has been paid per message sent or per user tracked, and a vendor paid for volume has no commercial reason to find out which of its messages caused anything. I set out how those meters shaped the industry in Martech Beyond Messages and MAUs, and will not repeat the argument here. The short version is that the industry was paid for what it carried, not for what it caused, and so it measured carriage.

The second is that few campaigns ran with holdouts. Without a group of comparable customers who did not receive the message, there is no way to separate the customers who bought because of it from those who would have bought anyway. Attributed revenue, the number most dashboards show, credits the message with every purchase that followed it. It is a record of coincidence, and very little can be learned from it.

The third is that results stayed in each brand’s slide decks. When a campaign worked, the brand’s team presented it internally and perhaps at a conference. The evidence of why it worked, and the evidence of everything that was tried and failed, stayed in a folder.

The fourth is that what agencies learned walked out of the door with their people. Agencies see many brands, and good agency people carry hard-won pattern recognition. But that knowledge lives in heads, not in systems, and it leaves when the person does.

None of this means vendors learn nothing. Benchmarks, testing tools and AI decisioning all exist, and some are very good. The claim is narrower: no martech company has yet made causal knowledge from its whole operating history the central asset it sells. Its experience is immense; its memory of what caused what is thin.

The result is a strange paradox. Martech has been the most experienced company in marketing that never learned from its experience.

3   Learn Across Brands: Experience at Scale

Brands already pay for cross-brand learning. They simply do not call it that.

When a company hires a chief marketing officer, it looks for someone who has done the job before, ideally at several companies. A CMO who has run retention at five brands knows things a first-time CMO does not: which loyalty mechanics wear out, which win-back offers train customers to wait for discounts, how long a lapsed customer stays reachable. Nobody suggests she has taken something proprietary from her former employers. We call it experience, and we pay a premium for it. The same is true when a brand hires an agency that has seen hundreds of campaigns. The agency’s value is precisely that it has learned elsewhere.

What I am proposing is the same thing, made systematic, measured and available to every brand rather than only to those that can hire the most experienced people.

Two fields show what shared learning can do when it is organised well. The first is medicine. Every patient benefits from evidence gathered across hospitals and clinical trials they never joined. A doctor choosing a treatment draws on what happened to thousands of other patients, none of whom is named in the evidence. Nobody regards this as a loss; it is the reason modern medicine works.

The second is aviation safety. In April 1976, NASA and the US Federal Aviation Administration set up the Aviation Safety Reporting System, through which pilots, controllers, dispatchers, cabin crew and maintenance technicians report incidents and near-misses. The system marked fifty years of continuous operation in April 2026, and it still runs on the principles it was designed around: reporting is voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and independent. Reports are de-identified before anything is shared, so that no person or company can be recognised from them. Hundreds of thousands of reports later, every airline flies more safely because of incidents that happened at other airlines. The lesson travels; the name does not.

Marketing has nothing like this. What would it look like?

The unit of learning is a decision trace: a record of one decision and what followed. It captures four things about the decision itself. The customer state: where this customer was, in recency, frequency, value and engagement, at the moment of decision. The intervention: what was done. The context: category, season, channel and what else was competing for the customer’s attention that week. The cost: of incentives, of fulfilment, of the message itself.

The next two need care, because the whole argument rests on them. It is tempting to say that each trace also records the incremental outcome for that customer. It cannot. We can see what one customer did after an intervention; we can never see what the same customer would have done without it. Lift is a property of groups, not of individuals. So each trace records its assignment: the experiment it belonged to, and whether this customer was randomly placed in the treatment group or the holdout. The experiment then supplies the incremental outcome: the difference between the randomised groups, measured in contribution rather than clicks, and stated with a range of uncertainty. Individual traces explain who responded and in what circumstances. The comparison between groups says what was caused.

Figure 2. A decision trace. Each record describes one decision; lift is estimated only by comparing randomised groups.

Failures count as much as successes. Case studies celebrate wins, so the industry’s shared memory is a highlights reel. The knowledge of what did not work, the free-shipping offer that brought back nobody, the win-back sequence that only hastened unsubscribes, is the hardest to find and often the most valuable. A system that records every decision with its holdout learns from failures automatically, because a failed intervention is simply a trace with an outcome of zero or less.

This changes the kind of knowledge available. A best-practice library says what successful brands tend to do. It is useful, and it is how most of marketing’s shared knowledge is packaged today. Cross-brand learning does something different: it predicts which intervention is likely to work for this customer, in this category, at this point of dormancy, and how confident that prediction is. The library describes the past in general. The prediction addresses the decision in front of you.

That prediction is a starting point, not a verdict. What worked for a fashion retailer in India will not automatically work for a bank in Britain, and even within one category brands differ in margins, purchase cycles, price sensitivity and the trust their customers place in them. A model that performs well in groceries can be confidently wrong in insurance, and pooled evidence applied to the wrong brand can make results worse rather than better. So the goal is not to assume that what worked elsewhere will work here. It is to begin with evidence gathered elsewhere, test its relevance against the brand’s own history, and update the prediction as local results arrive. Cross-brand experience supplies the starting hypothesis. Brand-specific evidence decides whether it survives. The learning should make the first local test smarter; it should never replace the test.

The benefit is largest for the brands that can least afford to learn alone. A large brand with millions of customers can run enough experiments to learn a good deal from its own history. A mid-sized brand with fifty thousand lapsed customers cannot: by the time it has tested enough offers on enough segments to know what works, many of those customers are gone. Pooled evidence lets it begin where larger brands have already arrived, and spend its own experiments on the questions that are specific to it.

Every brand gets the experience of a thousand brands, without any brand’s customers leaving home.

4   Know-How Travels; Know-Who Stays Home

Shared learning works only if brands trust it. That trust cannot rest on a vendor’s good intentions; it has to rest on rules a brand can check. Here is the compact I would offer, written as a promise rather than a defence.

What travels is know-how: patterns, playbooks, and models trained on de-identified outcomes. A pattern might be that customers who lapse after a single purchase respond better to useful content than to discounts in the first ninety days. A playbook might be a sequence of interventions, with timings and cost limits, that has worked across many brands in a category. A model might predict which customers in a dormant base are still recoverable, and at what cost.

What never travels is know-who: customer records, any brand’s own results, and anything that could identify a brand or a person. No brand’s customer list is visible to another brand. No brand’s campaign results are shown to anyone else. No playbook says, or implies, where it came from.

One rule makes this work. A lesson is shared only when many brands have taught it. A pattern seen at one brand, or two, stays where it was learned. Only when the same lesson has been confirmed across enough brands that no single contributor can be inferred does it join the shared playbook. Shared learning does transfer generalised knowledge; that is its purpose. What it must never transfer is anything a rival could trace to a particular brand: its results, its distinctive tactics, its customers. What enters the pool is what many brands have independently found to be true, which is the same principle that lets an airline learn from another airline’s near-miss without ever knowing whose it was.

Removing names is not enough to keep that promise, and the compact should not pretend otherwise. The UK’s data regulator, in its guidance on anonymisation, treats identifiability as a spectrum and asks whether a determined person with the right resources could re-identify the source. In a small category, a distinctive pattern can point to its source without carrying a name. So the compact needs technical safeguards as well as good intentions: a minimum number of contributing brands for every lesson, suppression of small or unusual slices, checks against inference from repeated queries, controls on what any output can reveal, contractual limits on use, and independent audit. These measures reduce the risk to a level a brand can check. They do not reduce it to zero, and the promise should say so.

Participation is opt-in, and it works on give to get. A brand that contributes its de-identified decision traces receives the shared playbooks and predictions. A brand that prefers not to contribute can still use the platform, but learns only from its own history. Each brand can see what it contributed and what it received. The case for joining is not altruism. It is that every participant improves faster than it could alone, in the same way that every airline is safer for belonging to a reporting system it could never have built by itself.

Throughout, the brand remains the data controller. The vendor works under the brand’s permissions and consent rules, and uses its customers’ data only for the purposes the brand has authorised. Those permissions are separate: the right to read, the right to recommend and the right to act are granted one by one. A learning permission must never quietly become a sending permission, and a model’s confidence that an intervention would work is not consent to run it. The learning that travels is about decisions, not about people.

What travels (know-how) What stays home (know-who)
Patterns confirmed across many brands Customer records: names, contacts, profiles and histories
Playbooks: sequences, timings and cost limits Any brand’s own results and campaign data
Models trained on de-identified outcomes Anything that could identify a brand or a person
Lessons that many brands have taught Small samples and rare, traceable results
Evidence of what tends not to work Consent records, permissions and the decision to act

Figure 3. The trust compact: what travels across brands, and what stays home.

Know-how travels; know-who stays home.

5   Act Within Them: What Forward-Deployed Marketers Learn from Engineers

Knowing what is likely to work is not the same as doing it. Most martech companies have treated execution as the brand’s job: the vendor provides the tools and the brand’s team uses them. In practice the team is stretched, the tools are underused, and good ideas stall somewhere between the recommendation and the launch. It is the difference between an idea that has been demonstrated and one that has been installed.

The software industry has a model for closing this gap, and it comes from engineering.

Palantir built its business by sending engineers to sit inside customers’ organisations, often for months, to make its software work on their real data and their real problems. It has two main engineering roles: Devs, who build the core platforms, and Deltas, forward-deployed engineers who deploy them to achieve customers’ outcomes. According to The Pragmatic Engineer, until around 2016 Palantir had more Deltas than traditional software engineers. Deltas work alongside deployment strategists, known internally as Echoes, who carry much of the organisational work: understanding how the customer operates, managing senior relationships and finding the problem worth solving. The engineer owns the technical build. The strategist owns the navigation.

The model has since spread well beyond Palantir. Between 2024 and 2025, OpenAI, Anthropic and Cohere expanded their forward-deployed engineering teams to help businesses put their models to work, and the Financial Times reported that monthly job listings for the role rose more than 800% in the first nine months of 2025. The reason is the one Palantir faced two decades ago: a powerful product delivers nothing until someone makes it work in a messy, specific environment.

Marketing needs the same role. I call it the Forward-Deployed Marketer, and five lessons carry over from engineering.

Embed in the real problem, not the brief. A brief describes what a brand thinks it wants. The real problem is usually somewhere else: in a data feed that misses returns, an approval process that kills timely sends, or a discount habit that has trained customers to wait. A Forward-Deployed Marketer works inside the brand’s own systems and numbers, close enough to see the problem rather than its description.

Pair judgement with building. The Echo and Delta pairing maps closely onto marketing. A brand strategist, in the Echo role, understands the brand’s customers, politics and priorities, and decides what is worth doing. An agent builder, in the Delta role, configures the agents, data flows and interventions that do it. Behind them, as the Devs stand behind the Deltas, a product team turns what works into product.

Have agreed authority to ship. A consultant who can only recommend is easy to ignore. A Forward-Deployed Marketer has agreed authority to launch controlled interventions: within a budget, with a holdout, inside guardrails the brand has approved. The contract specifies which actions run automatically, which need approval, which are prohibited, and how a mistake is reversed. The brand sets the limits; the marketer does not need fresh permission for each move inside them.

Pave the road. Bob McGrew, an early Palantir executive, describes field work as building a gravel road that solves one customer’s problem, which the product team then turns into a paved highway the next customers can drive on. For Forward-Deployed Marketers, every successful deployment should become a playbook or an agent. The first win-back programme in a category is built by hand. The fifth should be mostly assembled from parts.

Measure productivity. If the road is being paved, the evidence shows up in one number: brands and outcomes per marketer. As agents take over routine work, each Forward-Deployed Marketer should serve more brands and deliver more verified lift. Count the trust numbers alongside it, such as incidents and reversals, so that speed is never bought with carelessness. If brands and outcomes per marketer stay flat, the company is not building a product; it is staffing a service.

That last lesson is where the model most often fails. In The Palantirization of Everything, a16z’s Marc Andrusko notes that job postings for forward-deployed engineers are up hundreds of percent as companies copy the model, and argues that most are copying the look without the platform underneath. Without reusable parts, he warns, a company that sends people to its customers ends up as “Accenture for X” with a nicer front-end. Copying the job title without paving the road produces a services business. A simple replication test applies here directly: if the tenth deployment costs as much as the first, there is no factory, only a very good team. And as I argued in The Expensive Last 10%, the hard part of any deployment is not producing the capability but making it dependable, which is exactly what a paved road has to absorb.

Figure 4. How the engineering roles map to marketing roles.

Consultants advise. Forward-Deployed Marketers ship, and then make sure the next brand needs them less.

6   Underwrite the Outcomes

The third part of the loop is the one that turns learning and deployment into a business.

It is easy to confuse underwriting with outcome pricing. Anyone can offer a performance fee: we will charge you a share of the results. Most such offers are a pricing tactic, often a discount in disguise, made in the hope that results will be large enough to cover the vendor’s costs. Underwriting is different. An insurer that underwrites a risk has to predict it, price it, hold capital against it, and make money across a portfolio even though some individual policies lose. A martech company that underwrites outcomes has to do the same: predict the lift a programme is likely to deliver, fund the work before any result arrives, design holdouts the brand accepts as credible, manage the downside when a programme underperforms, and make a profit across its portfolio of brands.

Few companies can do all of that. Prediction needs the cross-brand learning of section 3. Execution needs the Forward-Deployed Marketers of section 5. Capital and discipline need a company willing to carry risk on its own balance sheet.

The unit matters. Underwriting attributed revenue is meaningless, because attributed revenue includes purchases that would have happened anyway. The unit is incremental contribution: the extra revenue caused by the programme, measured against a concurrent randomised holdout, less the cost of the incentives used to produce it and of fulfilling the extra orders. A simple illustration shows why the distinction decides everything.

An illustration, not a result. A brand has 100,000 dormant customers. It assigns 90,000 at random to a recovery programme and holds out 10,000. Over the measurement window, 6% of the treated group buy, against 4% of the holdout. Of the 5,400 treated buyers, 3,600 would have bought anyway; 1,800 are incremental. Each order is worth $120 and earns $50 after product and fulfilment costs. A dashboard credits the programme with all 5,400 orders, or $648,000 of attributed revenue. The incremental revenue is $216,000, and the incremental margin is $90,000. Now add the incentive. A $10 discount is paid on every treated order, including the 3,600 that would have happened anyway: $54,000. Incremental contribution is $36,000. Double the discount to $20 and the same programme, with the same lift, costs $108,000 in discounts and loses $18,000, while the dashboard still shows $648,000.

That last case is the trap. A programme that brings customers back with a deep discount can show handsome incremental revenue and negative incremental contribution, because the discount also pays the customers who would have come back on their own. Underwriting on contribution keeps everyone honest about that.

I have set out the commercial structure elsewhere: in No Lift, No Bill, the baseline the brand would have earned anyway, the verified lift above it, and the vendor’s share of that lift alone; and in Martech Beyond Messages and MAUs, the 6× floor under everything the brand spends. I will not restate either here, because the point for this essay is a different one.

Alpha is also how the system learns. A contract paid only on verified lift forces honest measurement, because neither side will accept a number it cannot check. Every programme runs with a holdout, every result is incremental, and every cost is counted. That is exactly the evidence the decision traces of section 3 need. A vendor paid on volume generates activity data. A vendor paid on verified lift generates causal evidence, and causal evidence is the best training material the loop can get. The contract is not only how the vendor is paid. It is how the system finds out what is true.

The difference between promising results and underwriting them is evidence, capital and discipline.

7   The Loop

Each part so far can be copied. A competitor can hire marketers and give them a new title. It can build agents. It can offer a performance fee. What it cannot copy quickly is what happens when the three parts are joined.

The evidence loop: Learn, Act, Underwrite, Learn. Cross-brand learning produces better predictions of which programmes will work for which brands and which customers. Better predictions let the company choose better opportunities to underwrite: brands where lift is likely, programmes where the cost is justified. Forward-Deployed Marketers deliver those programmes inside each brand. The contract verifies the results against holdouts. And the verified results, de-identified and pooled across brands, improve the predictions. The next round starts from a better place than the last.

Each turn makes the next one more profitable. Predictions sharpen, so fewer programmes fail. Fewer failures mean smaller losses across the underwriting book. Smaller losses let the company price more keenly, or take on brands that others would turn away. More brands produce more decision traces, and more traces sharpen the predictions again.

The replication loop: every paved road lowers the cost of the next deployment. The first programme in a category takes a strategist, an agent builder and weeks of work. By the tenth, most of the programme is an assembled playbook, and the marketers’ time goes to the parts that are specific to the brand. Lower deployment cost changes which brands are worth serving. A programme that once needed a large brand to justify the effort becomes viable for a mid-sized one, and then for a small one. That opens a long tail of brands that competitors without paved roads cannot afford to serve, and the long tail feeds more experiments back into the evidence loop.

Picture both loops in a single category. The first time a team recovers dormant customers for a home-furnishings brand, almost everything is new: which customers are still reachable, which offers bring them back without training them to wait for sales, how long a holdout must run before the result can be trusted. The strategist and the builder work it out by hand, and the contract is priced cautiously, because the prediction behind it is weak. By the fifth brand in the category, the team knows roughly which customers will respond and which will not, the sequence exists as a playbook, and the agents run most of it. The prediction is good enough to price the contract more keenly, and the deployment is cheap enough to offer the programme to brands a tenth the size of the first. Each of those smaller brands adds its own traces, and the sixth programme is better again. Nothing in this story requires a breakthrough. It requires that every programme is measured, recorded and reused.

The two loops reinforce each other. The evidence loop makes each deployment more likely to succeed. The replication loop makes each deployment cheaper. Together they mean the system gets both better and cheaper with every brand it serves.

Figure 5. Two loops. The evidence loop makes each deployment more likely to work; the replication loop makes each one cheaper, which brings in the brands that feed the evidence loop.

One distinction matters more than any other here: data scale is not learning scale. A platform serving a thousand brands does not necessarily know more than one serving a hundred. It may simply have ten times as many poorly measured campaigns, and a specialist serving fifty similar brands may learn more than a generalist serving a thousand unlike ones. The advantage depends on how much of the activity produces comparable, causal evidence. Three measures capture it better than any count of brands or messages. Evidence density: the share of deployments that run as proper experiments with credible holdouts. Prediction advantage: how much better pooled learning predicts lift than each brand’s own history alone. Replication efficiency: how much time and cost a proven play saves at each successive brand. Put together, they answer the question investors rarely ask: how much more reliably and cheaply does the system produce a dollar of incremental contribution at the hundredth brand than it did at the tenth?

The compounding has to be earned, not assumed. Learning may fail to transfer. Cheaper deployments may erode quality. A tactic used across many brands may fail across all of them at once in a downturn, giving the portfolio correlated losses. And contracts paid on lift can tempt a provider to take only the easy recoveries and leave the hard customers behind. A serious system tests for all four, and does not claim compounding merely because its customer count is rising.

It is worth being precise about what is the moat and what is only the machinery. Agents can be built by anyone, on models available to all. Data integration is becoming routine. Good marketers can be hired, at a price. These are the machinery, and none of them, alone or together, is defensible. What cannot be copied quickly is the accumulated combination: a history of decisions and verified outcomes across many brands; the rights to act inside those brands, granted through contracts and trust built over years; repeatable processes that turn field work into product; and the capital and track record to underwrite outcomes at prices others cannot match. A competitor starting today with the same software and equally good people would start with none of these, and the only way to acquire them is to run the loop for years.

This turns the old moat inside out. In the old model, a brand stayed because leaving was costly. In the new one, a brand stays because staying keeps getting more valuable: its programmes draw on more experience every quarter, its deployments get cheaper, and its contract pays only for what works. Leaving would mean giving up all three and starting again with a vendor that knows less. The brand’s own data and workflows stay portable, and it remains free to go. That is the point: it stays because of what it gains, not because of what it would endure. The answer to the CMO’s renewal question is a record, against her own holdouts, of what the system has learned and delivered for her.

The new martech moat is the value of staying.

8   Three Objections

“Google, Meta and Salesforce already have this intelligence.” Much of this is true. They have vast data across advertisers, far more than any martech company, and excellent AI engineering. The engagement platforms are moving fast too: Braze now offers AI agents that build journeys from conversational prompts, and Salesforce will add that to its own stack. Pretending a challenger will have more data or better general-purpose AI is not a serious argument. Incumbents may well have components of the loop. What few have shown is the complete combination: permissioned cross-brand causal learning, repeatable deployment, and portfolio-level underwriting of outcomes. Much of the advertising platforms’ learning is about acquisition: which audiences to buy, which ads to show, at what bid. The learning in this essay is narrower and different in kind. It is permissioned, built on the brand’s own relationships with existing customers rather than on rented reach. It is about retention and recovery rather than acquisition. And it rests on causal evidence from holdouts rather than on attributed conversions. More data does not substitute for the right data. There is also a harder test, and it is the one that matters: cross-brand learning must beat what each brand could learn from its own history alone. A large brand with years of well-run experiments may need little help. It also has to beat a strong incumbent’s recommendations. Until that head-to-head test is won, the moat is a hypothesis, and the first kill test in section 10 is designed to find out.

“This is consulting in disguise.” It is, unless two numbers move. The cost of deploying a proven programme must fall with each brand, and brands and outcomes per marketer must rise. A consulting firm’s revenue grows in step with its headcount. A loop’s revenue should grow faster than its headcount, because each marketer is supported by a growing set of agents and paved roads. If those numbers do not move, the objection is right.

“Outcome pricing is a discount.” For a vendor that cannot predict results, it is. It will win the deals where lift is easy and lose money on the rest. Outcome pricing is a good business only for a provider whose prediction and execution are better than the market’s. Then it can underwrite programmes at margins others would refuse, because it knows which bets are good. The pricing does not create the advantage; it is how the advantage gets paid.

9   What the Company Must Change

A martech company that wants to build this loop has to change more than its pitch.

Finance. Performance fees are paid in arrears. The work is done, the holdout is read, and only then does the vendor earn. Meanwhile it has paid its marketers, run its agents and, in some programmes, funded incentives. Outcome work therefore needs working capital, and the need grows with success. Each engine that runs on outcomes needs its own capital plan, with clear limits on how much risk the company carries at any time.

Organisation. Forward-Deployed Marketers need a career track of their own, with progression based on outcomes delivered and roads paved rather than accounts managed. They work in pairs, strategist and builder, and the pairs need a product team behind them whose explicit job is to pave roads: to take what works in the field and make it reusable. Without that team, field work stays field work.

Incentives. Marketers should be paid partly on the verified outcomes they deliver and partly on what they turn into product. The second matters as much as the first. A marketer who delivers excellent results through bespoke work that nobody else can reuse has helped one brand. One who turns that work into a playbook has helped every brand that follows. Trust belongs on the same scorecard: an intervention that makes money but breaks a customer permission counts as a failure, not a trade-off.

The investor story. Markets give variable revenue a lower multiple than subscription revenue, because it is harder to forecast. A company moving to outcomes should not hide this. It should show compounding instead: rising evidence density, a widening prediction advantage over brand-only learning, the falling cost of deployment, and the growing contribution margin across the underwriting book. Those numbers, if they move, tell a better story than recurring revenue, because they describe a business that improves with use.

Who can do this. The trade is easier for a profitable, founder-controlled company than for one that reports recurring revenue every quarter. Moving from subscriptions to outcomes means accepting a period in which reported revenue looks worse while the loop is being built, and a company judged each quarter on subscription growth will find that hard to explain. A company that funds itself and answers to no quarterly scorecard can make the trade and wait for the loop to compound. That is an advantage of structure, not a guarantee: large companies can build outcome programmes too, and buy capability quickly when they choose to. The opening lasts only as long as the challenger improves its evidence, economics and trust faster than they do. The Braze deal shows where the subscription path often leads: into a larger platform’s portfolio, valued as a multiple of the revenue it brings. That is a fine outcome for shareholders. It is not the only one available.

10   How This Could Fail

Every argument should name the evidence that would refute it, and the tests should be designed before the company scales, not after. The cleanest test of cross-brand learning is to take a group of consenting brands and randomise the decision system itself: pooled learning for some programmes, an equally capable system trained only on each brand’s own history for others, with execution and measurement held constant. Compare the lift, and compare how well each system’s forecasts held up out of sample. Track the cost and time of deploying the same proven play across successive brands. Stress-test the underwriting book against bad years. And have the trust safeguards audited by people who are not selling the programme. These are the conditions that would refute the thesis.

Test Kill condition
Cross-brand learning No out-of-sample gain over an equally capable system trained on the brand’s own history alone
Trust Brands decline to opt in, or protected brand information is shown to have leaked
Forward-Deployed Marketers Time and cost to deploy a proven play don’t fall across successive brands
Underwriting Forecast accuracy and contribution margin don’t improve as the portfolio grows, after losses and make-goods
The loop A competitor with the same software but no portfolio matches results within a year

Figure 6. Kill tests. If any of these conditions is met, the loop is not a moat.

The commitments should be staged in the same order. Prove that one intervention creates incremental contribution. Prove that it can be repeated cheaply at another brand. Prove that pooled experience predicts better than local history. Prove that a diversified portfolio can be underwritten at a profit after failures and make-goods. Each stage earns the right to fund the next. All five tests can be read within two or three years, and the first four much sooner. If the loop fails them, the company that built it will have built a well-run services business with an unusual pricing model. That is not a disaster, but it is not what this essay claims. If the loop passes them, the moat will be visible in the numbers long before anyone describes it in a pitch: deployment costs falling brand by brand, predictions getting more accurate, and contribution margins widening as the portfolio grows.

  • • •

The old martech moat was the cost of leaving. The new martech moat will be the value of staying, because every customer makes the system better at delivering results for the next.

Thinks 2147

FT: “This is an era of Davids, not Goliaths…Why smaller powers are thwarting bigger ones.”

Andy Kessler: “AI architecture is evolving. Instead of a trillion parameters, efficient small language models might use 70 billion and run on an Apple Mac. These local models have no token costs beyond the cost of hardware and electricity. But they must be less capable than the large language models, right? Not really. Stanford researchers show that a locally run small language model “can successfully answer 88.7% of single-turn chat and reasoning queries.” No question we’ll always have high-end models running in data centers. IBM still sells mainframes. But growth will happen elsewhere. Where? Another Silicon Valley saying I’ve lived by: Intelligence moves out to the edge of the network. The real breakthrough will happen when robust AI models run on smartphones. It’s already starting. In September, California-based PrismML released a compressed version of the popular open-source Qwen3.8 27B AI model. The company got it down to under 6 gigabytes. That means it fits not only on PCs but also on high-end smartphones. The memory size is reduced by roughly 9 to 10 times. There’s that factor of 10.”

NYTimes: “Strength training isn’t just for muscle and bone health — it’s also surprisingly good cardio.”

Mint: “Over the past two decades, Indian households have undergone an extraordinary material transformation. Our household data shows electricity access rising from 75% in 2004-05 to an estimated 99% in 2025-26. Toilet access has increased from 52.9% to 95%, Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) or piped natural gas (PNG) from 32.3% to 85% and tap water from just 19.4% to 80%. Refrigerator ownership has risen from 18.5% to an estimated 65% while air- conditioner ownership, almost negligible at 1.2% two decades ago, has reached 21.1%. Mobile phones, present in only 16.1% of households in 2004-05, are now almost ubiquitous. These are not cosmetic changes in consumption. They represent a profound improvement in everyday life. Development has entered the Indian household, its kitchen and bathroom, communications, mobility and comfort. Yet, beneath this transformation lies a less visible change: the face of disadvantage has changed faster than the structure of disadvantage.”

The Publisher’s Second Business

From telling readers what happened to helping them decide what to do next

The argument in one paragraph. For a century, publishers built their businesses around one job: telling people what happened. Readers have two more jobs, deciding what it means for them and doing something about it, and most of the value in those went elsewhere. Publishers once held part of it, through classifieds, and lost it to better software. AI now makes it cheaper to turn editorial knowledge into tools and services, but the same assistants that keep the answer also want the decision and the action. A publisher can build a second business only where it holds something the assistant lacks, can run it reliably, and can find someone who will pay. It need not own the screen: it can build the tool, supply the assistant, or partner with whoever completes the task. What matters is not who controls the interface, but who owns something the decision cannot do without.

1  The Business Newspapers Already Lost

For most of the twentieth century, a newspaper ran two businesses under one masthead. The first told readers what had happened. The second helped them act: find a job, rent a flat, sell a car, hire a plumber. That second business was classified advertising, and it was enormous. In 2000, American newspapers earned $19.6 billion from classifieds, about 40% of all their advertising revenue. Recruitment ads alone brought in $8.7 billion.

Within a decade most of it had gone. By 2009, classified revenue had fallen to roughly $6 billion; by 2012 it was $4.6 billion, down about 77%. Help-wanted advertising, the most valuable category, lost more than 90%. Many newspaper groups saw it coming and invested in online sites such as Cars.com, CareerBuilder and Apartments.com, which, as a Congressional Research Service report notes, drew classified advertising away from the papers’ own pages. Reach and a famous masthead were not enough. The winners had better software: search, filters, alerts and a market that grew more useful with every listing.

Figure 1. Publishing’s first second business, and how fast it went.

Publishers have had a second business before. They lost it because matching people with things went to whoever built the best software.

Some media groups did hold on to large second businesses, and those businesses grew bigger than the journalism. When Axel Springer split itself in two, its classifieds businesses, including the StepStone jobs platform and the Aviv property group, accounted for about €10 billion of a €13.5 billion valuation. Schibsted sold its newspapers to its main owner for about $570 million; its marketplaces stayed listed as a separate company. The Washington Post Company earned $2.9 billion, or 62% of its revenue, from its Kaplan education business in 2010, and when it sold the newspaper in 2013, it kept Kaplan.

These cases prove less than they seem to. Kaplan was bought, not built from the newsroom; it entered higher education by acquiring a chain of colleges. Marketplaces won on network effects and software, not on reporting. They show that media companies can own valuable businesses beyond journalism. They do not show that journalism itself can be turned into one.

Publisher Second business Built from the journalism? What happened
US newspapers Classified advertising Partly: local reach, not newsroom knowledge Lost most of it to specialist marketplaces
Axel Springer Job and property marketplaces No: separate marketplace businesses About three-quarters of group value; separated from the newsroom
Schibsted Online marketplaces No: marketplace software Newspapers sold to the founding trust
Washington Post Co. Education No: acquired Grew to 62% of revenue; newspaper sold, Kaplan kept
Dow Jones Professional information Closer: news archives, data and expertise About 40% of revenue and growing (section 4)

Table 1. Most successful second businesses were acquired or built as separate software businesses.

The distinction matters for what follows. A publisher can acquire a second business, as media groups have done for decades. The more interesting opportunity is to build one from the knowledge, relationships and expertise that publishing itself creates. History offers few examples of the second kind. Diversification of the first kind is already well under way: according to WAN-IFRA, revenue from “other” activities such as events and business services reached 25.4% of surveyed publishers’ revenue in 2025, up from 13.2% in 2021. This essay is about why knowledge-led second businesses may now become possible, and when they make sense.

2  Know, Decide, Do

Every reader has three jobs. Know: what happened? Decide: what does it mean for me? Do: what is my next step? Publishing has concentrated on the first, and the first has a public value no business model fully captures. But commercially, the middle job went to whoever stood nearest the decision: the search box, the comparison site, the broker, the adviser, the software vendor. Much of the third went to marketplaces.

Consider a local paper reporting that the city’s schools have changed their admission rules: new catchment boundaries, a lottery for oversubscribed schools, earlier deadlines. That is Know, and it is good journalism. But a parent reading it has a bigger problem. Which schools is my child now eligible for? How do they compare on the things I care about? When must I apply, and what documents do I need?

The paper already holds much of the knowledge to answer those questions. It has reported on every school for years. It knows the rules and the officials who wrote them. Yet it publishes the story and stops, and the parent takes the next step somewhere else, or alone.

Figure 2. Three jobs. Publishers kept the first; others captured the value in the next two.

The article informs the decision. The larger commercial opportunity often lies in helping the reader make it.

3  What Publishers Already Hold

A publisher setting out to help readers decide and act does not start from nothing. It holds six assets that most new entrants would have to build or buy:

  • Damaged, but still real. Trust in news stands at 37% across the markets the Reuters Institute surveys, a record low, yet a known masthead still carries more authority than an anonymous site.
  • Specialist expertise. Reporters who have covered schools, markets or one industry for years know where the traps are.
  • Verified archives. Decades of checked facts, figures and context.
  • Readers who come back on their own and have said what they care about.
  • Local knowledge. People on the ground who know which rule changed and which provider cut corners.
  • Convening power. The ability to bring people facing the same decision together.

Assets are not advantages until they are tested. An archive that any assistant can summarise is not proprietary intelligence. Trust in a headline is not permission to give regulated advice. And audience size is missing from the list on purpose: newspapers had huge audiences when they lost classifieds. An audience is a reason to try a second business, not a reason it will work.

The right question is not “what can we sell to our readers?” but “what can we help them do better than anyone else?”

4  When Knowledge Becomes Software

Until recently, turning editorial knowledge into a product meant hiring software teams and data engineers and waiting years. Only the largest publishers could afford it, and those that did built some of the best businesses in the industry. Dow Jones’s professional information arm, which sells risk, compliance and energy intelligence to companies, now accounts for around 40% of Dow Jones revenue, and management says a significantly greater share of its profit. Its Risk & Compliance unit grew 19% to $100 million in a single quarter this year. It is the clearest case of a knowledge-led second business at scale, built on news archives, data and editorial judgement.

AI changes who can try. A regional publisher can now build a working prototype of an answer service over its archive, a calculator that applies this year’s rules or a checklist that knows the local deadlines, in weeks rather than years. That is a prototype, not a product. Turning it into a service people rely on still means ingesting and verifying data, updating it when rules change, supporting users, securing their information and clearing the rights. Those costs can dwarf the cost of the first demonstration.

So AI does not remove the hard part; it moves it. Building gets cheaper; maintaining matters more. A wrong answer in a decision tool costs the reader far more than a wrong fact in an article. Accuracy, provenance and human oversight become the main operating cost of a second business, and its main source of value.

AI’s biggest opportunity for publishers may not be cheaper journalism. It may be more businesses that journalism can support.

5  The Assistant Wants the Same Job

There is an obvious objection, and it could sink the argument. The companies building AI assistants say plainly where they are heading. When OpenAI let users buy products inside ChatGPT in September 2025, it described AI as becoming “a key interface for how people discover, decide, and buy”. That is Know, Decide and Do in a single sentence. Assistants that summarise the news will also compare schools, model a loan and book an appointment. If they keep the answer, why would they not keep the decision and the action too?

Often they will. Generic decisions, such as the cheapest flight or the best-rated vacuum cleaner, will go to whoever has the widest reach and the best interface. That is the classifieds lesson again. Publishers without a differentiated asset have little reason to compete head-on with general-purpose assistants. Three assets are harder for an assistant to supply:

  • Verified, proprietary or local data. This year’s admission rules for one city’s schools, the cut-offs for a regional exam, the tradespeople who did the job properly. Information gathered and checked on the ground is often not on the open web, or not reliably.
  • A named institution that answers when it is wrong. When the stakes are money, health or a child’s education, people want someone answerable, not just an answer.
  • People who trust each other through the publisher: parents in the same district, investors in the same sector. Much of the value comes from the others in the room.

Holding one of these is necessary but not sufficient. A publisher may have trusted reporting on schools but no accurate, current admissions data. It may have a community but not the expertise to run a service reliably. It may be accountable but unable to serve thousands of users economically. A second business has to pass three tests:

  1. Do we hold data, accountability or community that an assistant cannot cheaply reproduce?
  2. Can we turn that advantage into a reliable, maintained product?
  3. Will readers or institutions pay enough, repeatedly, to make it profitable?

Figure 3. Three tests for a second business, and what to do when one fails.

Passing the first test creates an opportunity. Passing all three makes it a plausible business.

Job Assistant’s advantage Publisher’s possible edge Where the publisher stands
Know: general news summary Reach, speed, convenience Original reporting, provenance Best as a licensed source
Decide: generic product choice Breadth, comparison at scale Little Stay out
Decide: local or high-stakes choice Convenience Verified data, named experts Can compete, if all three tests pass
Do: generic purchase Checkout inside the conversation Little Stay out
Do: local service or application Convenience Verified providers, community Can compete, often through a partner

Table 2. The assistant’s default advantage, and where a publisher can still compete.

6  The Interface Isn’t the Business

Return to the parent. Suppose a regional publisher keeps the most accurate, current information about local schools: rules, catchments, deadlines, results. The parent does not visit the publisher’s site. She asks her assistant which school her child is eligible for. Three outcomes are possible.

  • The publisher runs its own eligibility checker and deadline tracker, and earns from readers who use it.
  • The assistant answers using the publisher’s verified data, under a paid licence, with the source named.
  • The publisher guides the parent, and an accountable specialist, such as a school-admissions service, completes the application, with any commercial relationship disclosed.

Only the first requires the parent to come to the publisher’s own screen. As assistants become the place where decisions start, the second and third may matter more. Supplying is different from licensing an archive for training: what is sold is live, maintained, verified knowledge, priced on use, and its value depends on being kept right. That is a business an assistant cannot easily build for itself, because it rests on people on the ground and an institution that answers for errors.

Figure 4. Three ways to turn trusted knowledge into a second business.

What matters is not who controls the interface, but who owns something the decision cannot do without.

7  Four Second Businesses

Four domains show where the tests are passed most often. Two deserve depth, because they show both the promise and the hardest question: who pays.

Professional intelligence is the proof that a knowledge-led second business can be large. Industry news tells a manager what changed. The second business tells the company what a new regulation means for it, whether a counterparty is safe and what to watch next, delivered inside the work through screening, monitoring and alerts. The advantage is proprietary, structured data plus accountability, and the customer is a company that pays for reliability because errors are expensive. Dow Jones shows the scale this can reach. It also shows the cost: the data must be maintained continuously, enterprise buyers are demanding, and liability comes with the territory. It proves the category, not that a small newsroom can copy it.

Education shows where the economics get hard. Education pages already report exam dates, results and policy changes. The second business helps a student or parent decide which exam, course or school fits, then do the work: eligibility checks, practice, assessments, applications and learning plans. The advantage is verified local data and a high-stakes need. But who pays for a school-admissions tool? A parent may use it intensely for a few weeks and never again. Schools paying for placement create an immediate conflict. The options each change the business: a membership that bundles the tool with other services, a contract with an education authority, sponsorship kept visibly separate from rankings, or supplying the verified data to the services and assistants parents already use. A reader’s need does not automatically mean a willingness to pay.

Finance follows the professional model for consumers: calculators, plain-language explainers and investor education, with next steps routed to licensed partners. Its boundary is regulation; in most markets, explaining is journalism, but personalised investment advice needs a licence. Local turns civic reporting into verified directories, bookings, events and memberships. Its advantage is local data and community; its risk is becoming one more directory, so “verified” has to mean something.

Domain Decide Do Likely model Who pays
Professional What this means for my company Screening, monitoring, alerts Build Enterprises, through licences
Education Which exam, course, school Eligibility, practice, applications Build, supply or partner Hard: members, institutions, licensees
Finance What this means for my money Next steps via licensed partners Build and partner Subscribers; disclosed partner fees
Local Which contractor, clinic, school Verified directory, bookings, events Build and partner Members, verified providers, events

Table 3. Four second businesses, each built on knowledge the publisher already holds.

8  The Trust Tax

Every second business tempts a publisher to spend the trust that makes it possible. A lender will pay for leads. A school will pay to be listed first. A retailer will pay a commission on every sale. Readers may trust a publisher’s journalism without wanting it to become their broker or their adviser.

Kaplan is the cautionary case, even though it was acquired rather than built from the newsroom. A Senate committee found that Kaplan’s higher-education business drew 85.9% of its 2010 revenue from federal student aid, and 87.9% including military education benefits. The same investigation documented aggressive recruiting and high withdrawal rates, while also crediting the company with significant later reforms. Meanwhile the parent company’s chief executive led the industry’s effort to soften new federal rules, as his newspaper covered the same policy fight. A second business had put the first in an awkward position.

The boundaries are not complicated, but they have to be built in from the start:

  • Editorial independence. The newsroom does not write for the second business’s clients.
  • Every commercial relationship and ranking method is visible at the point of decision.
  • Reader data is used only for what the reader agreed to.
  • Information, advice and advertising are labelled and kept apart.
  • Licences and oversight. Where advice is regulated, the publisher holds the licence or works through someone who does, with expert review and a visible process for complaints and corrections.

The hardest case is a service that succeeds commercially while trust in the newsroom falls. A publisher should decide in advance which trust measures would trigger a review, and be prepared to change or close the service if they move.

Trust is the asset only if the second business does not spend it.

9  Who Can Afford a Second Business?

Smaller publishers are under the most pressure. Over two years, small publishers lost about 60% of their search referrals, mid-sized ones 47% and large ones 22%. But pressure is not capability. Many smaller publishers lack product teams, capital, proprietary datasets or enough customers to support a software service. Some will do better through membership, philanthropy or specialist reporting than through any second business.

For those that do have an advantage, three structures are feasible without a large balance sheet: a focused local utility that does one job well; a shared service built with peers, so that several publishers spread the cost of the data and the technology; or a supply or partner arrangement that turns their verified knowledge into revenue without building a product at all.

Smaller publishers may need a second business most, but need is not evidence that they can build one.

10  The Economics of the Second Business

The test is contribution, not traffic. Contribution means revenue minus the costs that a second business adds: maintaining data, expert review, technology, support, liability, distribution and acquiring customers. A decision tool used by a few thousand people who renew every year can be worth more than an article read by a million, or it can lose money on every user. Only the arithmetic, against a fair baseline, will say which.

Revenue comes in several forms: subscriptions to tools, service fees, licences to businesses and assistants, disclosed partner fees, and events and memberships. Most second businesses will combine two or three.

The organisation sits beside the newsroom, not inside it. Journalists supply the knowledge; product builders turn it into tools; editorial standards govern both. Start narrow: one decision readers face repeatedly, with high stakes, where all three tests can plausibly be passed.

Governance needs deciding early. Table 1 showed what happens when a second business succeeds: when it is worth more than the journalism, investors want the two apart. A publisher should decide at the outset whether its second business exists to fund journalism, and design ownership accordingly.

11  What Would Prove This Wrong

Each of these tests can be run within 12 to 24 months, against a suitable comparison group:

Hypothesis Evidence that would challenge it
Publishers hold a real advantage Users of a publisher’s decision tool report no added value over a general assistant, and usage falls as assistants add the same features
Someone will pay Free use is high, but trials do not convert into recurring payments, licences or other revenue that covers costs
AI lowers the cost enough Verifying, updating and supporting the product consume most of its gross profit
Trust survives commerce Trust in the publisher falls among users exposed to the service, relative to those who are not
The interface need not be owned Publishers cannot earn from their knowledge either directly or by supplying assistants and partners
It is not only for giants After 24 months, profitable examples remain limited to the largest publishers

Table 4. Six falsification tests.

12  The Publisher of 2030

The publisher of 2030 will still be defined by its journalism. Reporting earns the trust, the expertise and the relationships that every second business depends on. Without the first business, there is no second one.

But journalism no longer needs to be the only product. Not every publisher will become a software company; not every archive will become a product; not every reader wants a publisher to act on their behalf. Those with a clear right to win will turn their knowledge into something readers and institutions can use: to choose a school, manage their money, run a business or find their way in their own city. Some will own the service. Others will power it from behind an assistant, or through a partner. The question for 2030 is not how many articles a publisher produces, but what people can reliably do because that publisher exists.

The first business of publishing was making information worth reading. The second may be making knowledge worth using.

Thinks 2146

FT: “The AI trade is no longer new and it is no longer “a” theme. Instead it has morphed into “the” theme — a vast, suffocating blob slathered on top of the global financial system, starving everything else of oxygen, distorting market reactions and leaving every portfolio, everywhere, alarmingly reliant on the fortunes of just one bet. Stocks, real estate, infrastructure, energy, emerging markets, some vintages of private equity . . . they’re all, to a large extent, the same trade.”

Mint: “Two reforms can help India move from a slow, expensive manufacturing destination to a fast, cheap one: averaging regular hours over a longer period and reducing the overtime premium.”

WSJ: “When we eat, the energy in the food is shared between our own cells and the trillions of microbes that inhabit our intestines. How much energy we absorb depends on the quality of the food and our gut microbiome. Controlled trials show how important this can be. On highly processed diets, the body can absorb roughly 97% of consumed calories. On minimally processed diets rich in intact foods, absorption can fall to 85% or lower. For a 2,500-calorie diet, that difference is about 300 calories a day. Yet the calorie counts appear identical. Calorie totals also don’t tell us where the absorbed energy goes. The quality of what we eat influences hormones, immune function, inflammation, insulin signaling and our gut bacteria. Together, these systems determine how nutrients are partitioned in the body.”

NYTimes: “Fourteen authors in the New Directions stable have received the Nobel Prize in Literature, including this year and last. How does this small press pack such a punch?”

Sadanand Dhume: “China still holds lessons for India—and any democracy. Julian Gewirtz, a China expert at Columbia University, calls the country’s economic takeoff “as much a story of bottom-up experimentation and exploration of international ideas as anything else.” By embracing meritocracy, China has made its universities world-class. China sees its cities as engines of growth, not merely cash cows for rural hinterlands. But these are arguments for improving Indian democracy—so it may one day offer the developing world a better example than China.”

Making AI Affordable for All

Private, Useful AI for Every Employee, at Emerging-Market Prices

**

What would it take to give every employee in an emerging-market company the AI tools that a few people in a rich company take for granted?

AI has an access problem hidden inside a pricing problem. The tools that make office work faster are priced in dollars, per seat and increasingly per task, for buyers in the richest economies. The leading office-suite AI add-on lists at $21 to $30 per user per month, on top of the base licence. A company in Mumbai, Jakarta or Lagos often pays much the same dollar price for employees whose salaries are a fraction of their counterparts’ in New York or London. So it buys a few seats for senior people, and everyone else goes without, or uses whatever free tool they can find.

This essay completes a series of three. The Compute Strait asked how much inference a job needs. The Compute You Already Own asked where the inference that remains should run. This one asks who gets it, and at what price. The goal is not cheaper AI for a few. It is useful, private AI for every employee, at a price an emerging-market employer can sustain.

My answer is not a set of cheaper substitutes for famous AI products. It is a shared utility inside the enterprise: a few everyday AI jobs, joined by one layer that remembers the work, running first on compute the company already owns, under rules the company sets. The rest of the essay explains why that combination could cost a tenth of today’s prices, what competes with it, what it would take to make the economics work for the supplier as well as the buyer, and how it could fail.

Figure 1. Three essays, three questions

1   AI is priced for the few

Run the arithmetic for a company of 500 people. At $20 per employee per month, below today’s list prices for the leading business add-ons, covering everyone costs $120,000 a year. For a services firm in India, that is the salary of several employees, spent on software for all of them. Few companies make that trade. They ration instead: seats for managers and a handful of enthusiasts, and nothing for the support agent, the operations clerk or the sales coordinator who would gain the most from help with routine writing and reading.

Figure 2. Covering every employee in a 500-person company (prices assumed)

When AI is priced per seat in dollars, an emerging-market company does not decide how to use it. It decides who may use it. Metered pricing makes this worse. A finance team that cannot predict the bill caps the usage, and the cap falls hardest on the people with the least authority to ask for an exception.

The market is not standing still, and an honest argument has to start there. The largest office-software vendors are folding AI into what companies already buy. One has bundled its AI assistant into its business plans, funded by a base-price increase of $2 to $4 per user a month rather than a separate add-on; the other has offered promotional prices on its business AI add-on. At the same time, employees without a company seat do not wait. Many paste work into free consumer tools, with no governance over what leaves the company or what comes back. The competitor is not only the $30 seat. It is AI bundled into software a company already pays for, and free tools its employees use without asking.

So the opportunity is not to introduce AI where none exists. It is to offer a coherent, governed and affordable alternative to fragmented tools and uncontrolled use. A bundled assistant serves the company that runs its whole office on one vendor’s suite. Many emerging-market firms do not: email may sit with one vendor, documents with another, accounts in a local system, customers on a messaging app. What they lack is AI that works across that mixed environment, keeps the company’s memory under its own control and costs a predictable amount. That is the gap this essay is about.

2   Four jobs, one suite

Most everyday AI use in a company reduces to four verbs. Ask: a private assistant that answers questions from approved company knowledge. Act: a mail and work agent that drafts replies and follow-ups, with nothing sent without a person’s yes. Listen: meetings transcribed and written up, ideally on the machine that recorded them. Watch: company records checked against rules, with each exception sent to its owner, with evidence.

None of these is new on its own. Self-hosted chat over company documents is already available as open-source software, and cheap tools exist for each of the other three. Four inexpensive applications would not be much of a business. What changes the picture is the work that passes between them.

Take a single meeting. On Tuesday morning, a team agrees three actions. The Listen job writes up the meeting and records who promised what, by when. The Act job drafts the three follow-ups, and each goes out only when its owner approves. On Friday, the Watch job checks the records: two actions are done, one has slipped, and its owner is told, with the evidence. The following week, a manager asks where Tuesday’s actions stand, and the Ask job answers from the same records, showing only what that manager is allowed to see. Nobody copied anything from one application to another.

Figure 3. One meeting, four jobs, one shared record

Separate subscriptions can be connected, of course, through integrations. But integration across four vendors is usually partial, expensive to maintain and fragile when any one of them changes. A shared architecture makes the connection the default rather than a project. The value is not four inexpensive AI applications. It is one inexpensive system that remembers what happened across them and helps finish the work.

What runs underneath matters less than buyers assume. The leading frontier models are proprietary; their weights cannot be installed on an office server. Open-weight models can be, and they are closer than most buyers think. Epoch AI finds that the best open-weight models lag the closed frontier by about four months on its capability index, and that open models able to run on a single top-end consumer graphics card typically match the frontier of six to twelve months earlier. Last year’s frontier now fits on a well-equipped desk. Not on every desk: that finding is about a high-end graphics card, not an ordinary office laptop. But narrower models doing narrower jobs reach far more modest hardware, and for summarising a meeting, drafting a reply or answering from a policy manual, that is often enough. It has to be proved task by task rather than assumed. The company is buying completed work, not a model name.

3   The office already owns much of the infrastructure

Every office already owns an AI computing infrastructure. Most of it has never been organised to work together. It sits on desks: well-specified laptops and desktops, some with enough memory to hold a capable open model, idle for much of the day while their owners are in meetings, at lunch or at home.

The architecture that uses it has three parts, and the order of importance matters.

  • An always-on office server provides the service guarantee. It routes every question, holds the models and their updates, and runs anything sensitive. If every employee laptop were switched off, the service would still work.
  • Idle employee machines contribute optional capacity. They take eligible, independent tasks while their owners are away and the machines are plugged in, each running a whole model so that nothing is split across machines.
  • The router uses an idle machine only when it helps. It sends work there only when the gain is measurable and the owner is unaffected; otherwise the server does the work.

In The Compute You Already Own I set out why such an office pool is plausible where a public pool of strangers’ devices is not, and the questions that decide whether it pays. The most important is timing. What matters is not total idle computing power. It is dependable compute available in the hours employees need AI. An office might have twenty idle machines at lunchtime and three at eleven in the morning, precisely when questions peak. If one dedicated server handles the load more cheaply, use the dedicated server. The business does not depend on proving that distributed office compute always wins.

It is tempting to call this an “Airbnb for compute”. As an image, it works: an underused asset put to productive use. As an operating model, it misleads. Airbnb rents strangers’ property to strangers. This is a private pool inside one company, among colleagues, managed by IT.

The economics need stating carefully too. On hardware the company already owns, the marginal compute cost of an answer is mostly electricity. The service around that compute is not free. Models have to be kept ready in memory, machines’ availability detected, work moved when a machine disappears, employee endpoints secured and failures diagnosed. Those costs belong in any honest comparison, and they are the reason the dedicated server comes first.

4   The meta-model decides what runs where

If every question goes to a large model, the system is expensive. If every question goes to a tiny one, it fails on the hard cases. The answer is a meta-model in the practical sense: a routing layer that chooses the cheapest way to complete each task correctly. It follows the ladder from The Compute Strait. Code handles dates, sums and rules. Validated memory answers what is already settled. A small local model extracts, classifies and drafts. The office server’s larger model handles harder shared work. A premium external model is called only for the cases that need it, and only where policy allows that data to leave the approved environment.

The router must itself be cheap: rules, capability checks and past evaluations first, never an expensive model asked whether an expensive model is needed. And it should record what it learns: completion, errors, corrections, response time and cost per completed task, by type of work. Over time the company comes to own an evidence-based map of what its own work requires.

Figure 4. One suite, one shared layer, compute the office owns before compute it rents

5   A tenth of the price, if the economics hold

The commercial target should be bold: roughly a tenth of developed-market per-seat prices, about $2 to $3 per employee per month for everyday workplace AI. Four things make it plausible. Open-weight models carry no per-token licence. Much of the compute is already owned. One shared layer serves four jobs instead of four vendors each building their own. And frugal routing keeps premium spending to the cases that need it.

A low price has to work for the supplier as well as the buyer, and that is where the argument is most exposed. At $2.50 per seat, a 500-person company brings in $1,250 a month and a 50-person company $125. Against that sit installation, updates, security patching, monitoring, compatibility testing and support. Those costs do not shrink in proportion to headcount. Supporting a 50-person office does not cost a tenth of supporting a 500-person one.

Figure 5. Supplier economics per office at $2.50 a seat (all costs assumed)

Office size Monthly revenue Cost to serve Monthly margin
50 seats $125 $425 –$300
200 seats $500 $500 $0
500 seats $1,250 $650 +$600
2,000 seats $5,000 $1,400 +$3,600

Assumes $400 a month fixed per office (updates, monitoring, security, support) plus $0.50 per seat. Illustrative, not measured.

Three design choices follow. A tenth-price seat needs a minimum commitment, either a seat floor or a fixed office fee, so that small offices cover the cost of serving them. It needs standardised installation and predominantly self-service operation, because a support visit can wipe out a year of margin. And it probably needs local partners who install and support it, paid from the hardware and services they sell rather than from the subscription.

The buyer’s comparison must be complete too. For the 500-person company, the full cost includes the subscription, the office server, IT time and approved premium use.

Figure 6. The buyer’s full annual cost, 500 employees (all inputs assumed)

Item Assumption Annual cost
Subscription $2.50 per employee per month $15,000
Office server $4,000, written off over three years $1,333
IT time Two hours a week at $15 an hour $1,560
Premium AI Administrator cap $3,000
Total   about $20,900

Against $120,000 for developed-market seats, that is about a sixth, not a tenth, once everything is counted. Against AI bundled into an existing suite, the money may be similar, which is why price cannot be the whole case. The case is coverage across a mixed environment, memory the company keeps and control over where data goes. The $2 to $3 seat is a design constraint to be proved in pilots, not a price the architecture has already earned. The test is cost per completed task, including hardware, IT effort and human rework, not the licence fee alone.

A flat price also cannot mean infinite work for infinite users. It means a predictable price per employee, with fair-use and concurrency limits set by the office’s own capacity: when the office is busy, answers queue or slow down; they do not generate a bill. Premium external inference is different. It should be approved by the administrator, priced separately and visible before it is spent. A flat price is a promise about the bill, not about unlimited compute.

6   Sovereignty is an operating promise

For a bank, a manufacturer, an insurer or a services firm, the attraction is not only cost. It is control. Questions, documents and answers can be processed on machines the company owns, under permissions the company sets.

The promise needs precise wording. “No data leaves the building” is too narrow: companies have remote employees, several offices, existing cloud software and, sometimes, a good reason to use a premium external model. The real promise is this: no enterprise data leaves the approved processing environment without explicit policy authorisation. That environment may span offices and a private cloud the company controls. Telemetry, software updates, connectors to other systems and premium escalation can all carry data out unless they are configured not to, which is why the promise is a policy to enforce and audit, not a slogan inherited from where the server sits. Sensitive classes of work, such as legal, HR and finance, should run only on machines IT controls, by default rather than by request.

The record-keeping needs the same precision. Storing every raw prompt indiscriminately would defeat the purpose. But a ledger that records nothing but usage is too thin for work that needs evidence. Audit records may need source references, decisions, approvals, model versions and access logs, kept under retention rules the company sets. The objective is that the enterprise keeps control of sensitive information and can prove where it went, who saw it and what was done with it.

Regulation is a reason for some buyers, not all. In India, the data-protection law does not impose blanket localisation: its cross-border framework allows transfers except to countries the government restricts, while sectoral regulators such as the RBI can impose stricter rules. Local processing can simplify governance and satisfy contractual or sectoral requirements. For most firms, it is a choice about control rather than a statutory necessity, and the essay should not claim otherwise.

Open source helps, but it is not a guarantee. Code that can be inspected makes a backdoor findable, not impossible. The stronger promise is verifiability: published code, signed releases, builds that independent parties can reproduce, documented components and external audits, practices of the kind NIST’s Secure Software Development Framework sets out. Trust comes from what can be checked, not from what is promised.

7   The layer that lasts

Underneath the four jobs sits the asset that matters most: the shared operating layer. It records what each application knows, what each employee is authorised to see and do, where each task should run and whether completed work met the agreed standard. Applications are replaceable. A company might change its meeting writer, its chat assistant or its local model next year. It should not have to replace its memory, its policies or its operating history when it does.

This is the argument of From Rented to Owned, carried into the office: own what compounds, rent the rest. Here, what compounds is the record of the company’s work and the rules around it. The models underneath can be swapped as better ones appear, and the routing adjusts to use them.

It also clarifies what kind of business this is. A suite of cheaper substitutes competes on price. A trusted, portable operating layer that helps several applications work together competes on continuity, convenience and control. The first can be undercut by any incumbent willing to cut a price. The second becomes more valuable the longer a company uses it.

8   The business model

The opportunity grows in three levels. At the first, a company saves on AI bills by running routine work on hardware it owns. At the second, it gains private AI infrastructure: local routing, permissions, memory and controlled escalation, valued for control as much as cost. At the third, several applications share one operating layer for office intelligence. The lasting advantage sits at the third level, and it comes from making many applications cheap and dependable to run, not from idle processors alone. It would be a mistake to claim all three before proving the first.

Figure 7. How the business earns, and what it refuses

Revenue line How it works Why it fits
Base subscription A flat price per employee, about a tenth of developed-market seats, with a seat minimum or office fee Predictable for the buyer; covers everyone; covers the cost to serve
Premium escalation A disclosed commission on approved external inference, capped by the administrator Pays for hard cases without hidden metering
Hardware and partners The always-on office server, sold or leased, installed and supported by local partners One machine turns idle capacity into a dependable service
Advertising Not offered A product sold on keeping data inside cannot be paid for by anyone who wants to know what is in it

Two cautions belong in the model itself. If the escalation commission becomes the main source of margin, the incentive tilts towards sending work outside; disclosure and caps exist to prevent exactly that. And the natural first market is emerging-market enterprises, where the price gap is widest, software environments are most mixed, local languages matter and data rules are tightening. Those buyers do not need a lesser version of AI. They need a different economic architecture for delivering it.

9   How the thesis could fail

Three bets should be tested separately. Product fit: does one integrated suite complete everyday work better than separate tools or the AI bundled into existing software? Economics: does a seat at around a tenth of developed-market prices, with a minimum commitment, cover models, support, updates and margin? Trust: will security and compliance teams approve a shared local service, and will employees use it without feeling their machines or their data have been commandeered?

Figure 8. Eight ways the thesis fails

Failure What would show it
Bundled AI is good enough Companies on one vendor’s suite see no gain worth switching for
Open models fall short on real office work The share of tasks escalated to premium models stays high, or human rework rises
The shared record adds little Users rarely move work between the four jobs; the suite behaves like four separate tools
The idle pool adds nothing One office server matches the pool at equal cost; then sell the server and drop the pool
The price cannot fund the service Cost to serve exceeds revenue even above the seat minimum
Buyers trust global brands more than local control Pilots convert slowly even where the product performs
Escalation becomes the real business Commission revenue outgrows subscriptions
Global vendors cut prices for emerging markets Developed-market tools arrive at local prices, removing most of the gap

A ninety-day pilot in one office of 20 to 50 consenting users would answer much of this. Run the four jobs on real work against current practice, including whatever bundled or free AI tools employees already use. Serve them three ways: one dedicated office server, the server plus an idle-machine pool, and a hosted small model. Measure completion, errors, response time, availability at peak hours, human rework, energy, the share escalated outside, the share of work that crosses between jobs, the supplier’s cost to serve and cost per completed task. Set the stop rules before starting.

If the suite needs constant human rescue, the shared record adds nothing, or incumbents close the gap on price and control, this particular route is wrong. The need it addresses does not go away.

**

The first wave of AI sold extraordinary intelligence to those who could afford the invoice. The next should make dependable intelligence ordinary, private and affordable across whole organisations, in the countries where most of the world’s office workers live. The answer is not merely to make intelligence cheaper. It is to make it a shared utility inside the enterprise: available to every employee, across applications, with the company keeping control of its data, its memory and its costs.

Affordable for one person is a subscription. Affordable for everyone is infrastructure.

Thinks 2145

Cody Finke: “My proposed explanation is that in order to impact growth, the innovation must impact a market large enough to matter or a set of markets large enough to matter. While it is statistically possible for hundreds or even millions of innovations to add up to high growth (and for indoor plumbing to lead to millions of innovations), it is much more likely that a smaller number of innovations impacting very large markets occurred. I argue that 7 times in the special century, innovations dramatically cut cost for products that, by themselves, were more than 1% of economic growth. This has never happened since 1970. One way to drive economic growth is to reduce the cost of things the economy needs. When something gets cheaper, the economy can produce the same amount of it and still have resources left over to make other things. Spending the excess money from cost reductions pulls freed resources into new uses, and, via Jevons paradox, we also, often, end up buying more of the thing that got cheaper.“

Henry Mintzberg: “As a manager, get out of your office, get on the ground, and find out what’s going on.”

NYTimes: “A superhabitable world — as scientists imagine it — is about 20 to 30 percent wider and twice as massive as Earth, and is placed at the right distance from its star for water to flow on its surface. The stronger gravity of this bigger Earth would hold on tighter to ambient molecules than Earth does, giving the planet a thicker atmosphere and a warmer and more stable climate, fueling the growth of extraterrestrial plants and animals (or their equivalents). The super-Earth’s bigger iron core would erect a stronger magnetic field around it, better blocking cosmic radiation. As for the superhabitable planet’s surface, picture paradise. An enlarged orb would be rounder and smoother than Earth, as its stronger gravity erodes continental shelves and fills in trenches. Water would spill evenly over its surface as shallow lakes and seas.”

Adam Grant: “There are three important roles that people play in our lives: allies, pals, and companions. Allies share our goals; they’re our most reliable and capable collaborators. Pals share our interests and hobbies; they’re our go-to people for a pickleball game or a karaoke night. Companions share our values; they’re our best sources of support and compassion.”

When Search Keeps the Answer

Published November 15, 2026

Publishers and brands are losing the same click. ActionAds and NeoNet could turn their two problems into one market.

1 The Click That Does Not Come

On 29 October 2026, Alphabet had the worst day in its history as a public company. Its shares fell about 13%, and roughly $500 billion of market value disappeared during the session. Most of the selling was about spending, not search: capital spending had more than doubled and free cash flow had turned negative.

One line on the earnings call deserves longer attention than the share price. Google’s chief business officer attributed the slowdown in search revenue mainly to currency and a handful of industries, and then added that fast-growing AI Mode queries monetise less well than classic search. The day before, Google had announced ads in AI Mode in ten more countries, including India, and ads inside follow-up questions in the US. Google is not standing still. It is moving its toll booth into the conversation.

What happens to everyone else is becoming clearer. When Google shows an AI summary, users click a traditional result in 8% of visits, against 15% when there is none. A randomised experiment by Saharsh Agarwal of the Indian School of Business and Ananya Sen of Carnegie Mellon, which hid AI Overviews from some users, found that showing them cut outbound organic clicks by about 40%, with no detectable effect on sponsored clicks. That experiment tested AI Overviews inside classic Search; AI Mode, the conversational experience, is newer and less studied, though early evidence points the same way.

Figure 1. Two studies of different design, one direction: fewer organic clicks leave where the AI answers

The finding on sponsored clicks narrows the argument, and it should. The evidence does not show search becoming too expensive for advertisers. It shows search becoming less dependable as a route outwards. For twenty-five years the bargain was simple: you search, Google points, you leave. Increasingly, Google answers and you stay.

Search brought customers to businesses. AI Search increasingly brings answers to customers.

2 Two Businesses, One Dependence

Two groups feel this most, and they are rarely discussed together.

Publishers first. Data from Chartbeat for the Reuters Institute showed Google organic search traffic to more than 2,500 news sites falling by a third globally in a year, and small publishers losing 60% of their search referrals over two years. The Reuters Institute is careful to say that AI summaries are not the only cause; changes in search and in audience behaviour matter too. But the direction is not in doubt, and advertising follows pageviews down. In How Publishers Can 10X Their Revenue I described what this means: the visit that paid for journalism is being replaced by an answer that pays for nothing.

Brands next. A lapsed customer has several ways back to a brand: its app, its website, its emails, search, and increasingly an AI assistant. When she has stopped responding to the brand’s own channels, search is one of the most important. She types the brand’s name or the category, clicks and buys. Some of those clicks were free organic results; others the brand paid for. The free part of that route is the part now narrowing. The paid part still works, but it is rented, and the brand pays again for a customer it already had. The claim here is weaker than for publishers: fewer outbound clicks need not mean fewer purchases, and the evidence of harm to brands is still emerging. In The AI Revolution’s Hidden Sponsor I argued that this reacquisition toll helped finance the AI build-out. It is now reshaping where attention lands.

Put the two side by side and the symmetry is plain.

Publishers depended on Search for their readers. Brands depended on it for part of the way back to their customers. Both now find that journey controlled by an intermediary that increasingly keeps the answer.

Neither can fix this by doing more of the same. Both need an additional route back that they control, and each, as it turns out, holds something the other needs.

3 The Publisher’s Answer

The publisher’s first move is to change the unit of its economics, from the pageview to the relationship. The audience that survives AI search is the one that comes back on its own, and the largest such audience most publishers have is their email list. Most run it as a pipe, built to send readers back to a website that search no longer feeds.

Run as a product, the list becomes something else. A NeoLetter is composed when it is opened rather than when it is sent, so the reader sees what is current, and it lets her act without leaving the inbox: answer a poll, save a story, request a quote. That builds the habit first. Monetisation comes after, and in a different form.

To raise yield, publishers must sell actions, not impressions.

An ActionAd is a sponsored action inside earned attention: a test-drive booking in a motoring newsletter, a fund factsheet requested from a markets digest, a re-permission for a partner brand. Because AMP for Email does not allow third-party ad components, these are modules the sender controls, with plain HTML fallbacks for inboxes that cannot run them. The first advertiser should be the publisher itself – its events, subscriptions and verticals – before any third party pays.

Set out against search, the difference is in what is sold and who keeps the relationship.

Classic Search AI Mode Inbox ActionAds
Signal of interest A typed query A conversation A publication the reader chose to open
Where attention sits Google’s results page Google’s answer The publisher’s inbox relationship
What is sold A click A sponsored recommendation, and increasingly a completed action A completed action
Who holds the relationship Google Google The publisher, and through it the brand
Pricing Auction per click Auction, folded into Search campaigns Per incremental action, tested against holdouts

Search monetises expressed intent. ActionAds monetise earned attention.

Google is not standing still here either. On its earnings call, Sundar Pichai described agents that book reservations, fill in forms, schedule appointments and make purchases, and Google already offers direct checkout for hundreds of thousands of brands. So the difference is not that Google sells clicks while email sells actions. It is between actions coordinated by an intermediary that controls discovery, and actions initiated by a brand that already knows its customer, carried through attention she has chosen to give. Google’s actions run through Google’s relationship with the shopper. ActionAds run through the publisher’s relationship with the reader, and CRM Ads through the brand’s own.

The question is not who completes the action. It is who holds the relationship after it.

4 The Brand’s Answer

The brand’s problem is different. It does not lack customers; it lacks their attention. Its database holds millions of people who bought once and now ignore its emails. The question is how to reach them before paying to rent them back.

In CRM Ads: Your Customer, Someone Else’s Attention I proposed an order: owned attention first, relationship attention second, rented attention last. The middle rung is the new one. Relationship Media is a brand reaching its own known customer through attention another party has earned.

Consider one customer. She bought from a fashion retailer last year and earned loyalty points. She has not opened the retailer’s emails in months. She does open a travel publisher’s Digest every morning, and when she subscribed she granted a “Your Brands” permission: brands she already buys from may send her useful reminders there, for a stated purpose, and she can switch any of them off. This month her points are about to expire. NeoNet matches the retailer’s unfinished action to the Digest at the moment she opens it, and a clearly labelled panel appears: a brand you shop with has loyalty points expiring this month. She taps, and her balance and redemption options open on the retailer’s own secure page, not in the publisher’s email. The Digest carries the invitation; the brand’s surface carries the detail. The relationship is restored, the panel cancels itself, no retargeting budget is spent, and the publisher earns a fee for carrying a useful action.

Figure 2. One customer, three rungs: the relationship rung does the work before the rented one is needed

That is a CRM Ad. It is not prospecting: it reaches only customers a brand already has. It rests on rules that are not negotiable:

  • No reach across brands without permission the customer can see, understand and revoke.
  • No payments, passwords or identity checks on a third party’s surface, and no personal details such as balances until the customer chooses to look, on the brand’s own surface.
  • No banks as hosts, and no prospecting or lookalikes in the first version.

Now the two halves meet. Publishers rebuilding direct audiences create earned attention that needs monetising. Brands with customers who no longer respond hold relevant actions that need a route. NeoNet sits between them, matching deterministically where the same permissioned identity exists on both sides, and deciding at the moment of open rather than days earlier when a campaign was set up.

Figure 3. Two casualties of AI search, one market – and a loop that can compound

One group’s problem is the other’s supply.

The market can compound. More recurring, permissioned attention creates more places to route useful actions. Better routing raises publisher yield and lowers the brand’s cost of recovery. Higher yield funds better publications, which earn more attention. And supply is not limited to publishers. A retailer, airline or jobs platform that builds a successful Brand Digest earns attention too, and can carry other brands’ actions while sending its own; some members will sit on both sides of the market. The loop runs in reverse just as easily. Irrelevant actions, poor matching or over-monetisation would spend the attention the whole network depends on.

A brand can measure its side with one number, Alternative Reach: the share of its attention-dark customers who are reachable, with permission, through another member of the network. NeoNet connects unfinished customer intent to attention that already exists.

5 The Market That Has to Be Earned

None of the parts is new on its own. Google’s Customer Match already lets a brand upload its customer list and reach matched customers across Search, Gmail and YouTube, including dormant ones. Google Ad Manager serves ads in participating publishers’ newsletters, largely as image creatives, because inboxes cannot run the scripts display ads rely on. LiveIntent built an advertising network across thousands of newsletters before Zeta Global bought it in 2024. The claim here is narrower: actions completed inside the email, routed through permissioned earned attention, and priced on incremental outcomes measured against holdouts. That combination is harder to copy than any single piece. It has to be demonstrated, not presumed.

Google could build it, partner with it or compete with it. It has the advertisers, the ad server and newsletter distribution through participating publishers. What it does not hold automatically is the reader’s permission for one brand to reach her through another’s publication, or the authority to put actions inside other senders’ emails; owning Gmail confers no right to commercialise those messages. This is less a new technology than a new market design, and its economics will be decided by the publishers and brands who choose to join.

Every participant will ask why it should switch. A brand will ask why it should use NeoNet instead of Customer Match; a publisher, why ActionAds instead of its existing newsletter advertising. Each needs its own scoreboard.

Participant What must be demonstrated
Publisher Higher net revenue per thousand engaged readers, after costs, with no loss of engagement, subscriptions or retention
Brand Lower cost per incrementally recovered customer, or more incremental gross profit, than paid and owned alternatives
Network Permissioned Alternative Reach, match rates, completed actions and positive contribution economics

The decisive test is simple to describe. Take eligible dormant customers and split them at random into three groups: a holdout that receives only the brand’s usual activity, a group reached through conventional paid reacquisition such as Customer Match, and a group reached through CRM Ads. Measure incremental recovery, gross profit and fully loaded cost. Separately, measure whether ActionAds dent the publisher’s future engagement.

The test is not whether NeoNet produces actions. It is whether it recovers customers more profitably without consuming the attention that makes the network valuable.

Order matters more than ambition. Earn the attention first. Monetise it with ordinary ActionAds. Only then earn the permissions and identity coverage that CRM Ads need. Prove the economics before expanding the permission; expand the permission before expanding the specificity.

What would prove this wrong

  1. Readers decline the “Your Brands” permission, or find it unsettling.
  2. Publishers cannot build enough recurring attention to supply a market.
  3. Publisher net revenue per thousand engaged readers is no better than existing newsletter advertising, or engagement falls.
  4. In the three-way test, CRM Ads recover customers no more profitably than paid reacquisition or the holdout.
  5. The permission design cannot satisfy India’s data protection rules.
  6. A better-funded player assembles the pieces first, which would confirm the idea and lose the race.

Search will keep sending customers for many purchases, and paid search will remain a powerful route. But the businesses that depended on it for the way back now need a second road. The first generation of internet advertising monetised pages. The second monetised searches and feeds. The third may monetise useful actions inside relationships that already exist.

The future of advertising may not be about finding a better place to display an ad. It may be about finding the most trusted route to complete the customer’s next action.

Thinks 2144

Dwarkesh Patel: “I think we’re a couple years away from systems that match humans across all cognitive domains and which vastly outnumber humanity and are thinking much faster. I think this will have a big impact on the world. It’s very hard to think about what kind of impact it will have. Some of it is just inherently unpredictable, but trying to understand what is happening and articulate it seems like an important thing to do right now.”

WSJ: “Aldaron is part of a new breed of companies centering their entire business models around applying new technologies…Aldaron’s investments are aimed at increasing head count and improving operations at portfolio companies by accelerating the adoption of AI. Aldaron avoids businesses whose strategy involves laying people off, Mendez said.”

NYTimes: “There are roughly 700 companies pursuing innovations in the overall care economy, according to Anna Steffeney, executive director of FamTech.org, an association of care companies in the technology sector. Within that niche is an emerging market for parent-focused companies, which are often founded by exhausted parents themselves, Steffeney said. Apps including Ollie, Fambot, Ohai and Ava aim to function as household managers, and the majority of users so far are mothers, according to the chief executives of these start-ups. Other parents are creating their own D.I.Y. systems by leveraging general-use artificial intelligence systems — like ChatGPT, Claude or, more recently, Muse — that are more capable but also require more skill to prompt successfully. The agents typically demand access to an individual’s emails, calendars and other communication platforms.”

Kevin Kelly on Swarm Intelligence: “Here is a possible world 50 years in the future, one I think is more likely than the scenario most people expect, which is one huge AI in the sky. Fifty years from now most AI is invisible. There is nothing to see. It is sort of like air – always there, always on, everywhere. Something you need and use but take for granted. AI is so prevalent we become blind to it. You don’t need to log onto it, or even to summon it. Rather you inhale it. Instead of a central AI brain, AI is like a gas, composed of zillions of tiny interacting AIs that create an atmosphere. These zillions of minds are like eukaryotic cells in your body, or hundreds of varieties of bacteria in your gut. They form a presence. They are woven together into a vast network of intelligences that create an AI background. This society of AI minds is not so much seen by humans, as it is felt. Unlike the AI of today, it will be deeply embodied – into robots, vehicles, buildings, and devices. But its embodiment will be so wide, so deep, so pervasive, that it will become the background.”

FT: “The wisdom of prediction markets…Trades can contain valuable cues for businesspeople and investors.”

The AI Revolution’s Hidden Sponsor

Published November 14, 2026

Who paid for the AI boom, and what happens to the businesses paying the toll

1 The Profits Behind the Revolution

Every technological revolution has a financier. The railways were built on the bond markets. The telephone network was built on regulated monopoly rents. The early internet was built on venture capital and an equity bubble. The AI revolution has many financiers – venture funds, sovereign wealth, chipmakers, enterprise software profits – but one of the largest hides in plain sight. Among the companies building the most AI infrastructure, two of the most powerful cash engines were built on advertising. Alphabet and Meta turned the sale of attention and intent into extraordinary profits, and those profits are paying for much of the foundation on which the next technological era is being built.

Add Amazon, the third giant of digital advertising, and the scale becomes clear. In 2023 the three companies earned about $417 billion from advertising between them. By 2025 that had risen to about $560 billion, up 34% in two years. Over the same two years, their capital expenditure – the money spent on data centres, chips, networking and power – rose from $112 billion to $293 billion, up 162%. In 2023, capital spending absorbed 43% of the cash their operations generated. In 2024 it absorbed 52%. In 2025 it absorbed 70%. The figures come from the 2025 annual filings of Alphabet, Meta and Amazon.

The cash engines grew strongly. The capital demands of the next era grew far faster.

The 2026 plans extend the curve sharply. Alphabet has guided to capital expenditure of $195–205 billion, Meta to $135–145 billion, and Amazon to about $220 billion. Together that is roughly $560 billion: almost double 2025, five times 2023, and a third more than all the operating cash the three companies generated last year. Not every dollar is for AI; some serves warehouses, logistics and ordinary computing. By the companies’ own accounts, most of it supports AI and cloud infrastructure, and the direction is unambiguous: Alphabet and Amazon have both said they will spend meaningfully more again in 2027.

Figure 1. Alphabet, Meta and Amazon combined, 2023–2026. Capex is gross cash purchases of property and equipment; 2026 is guidance and includes non-AI spending.

Precision matters about who is paying, because the three companies are not alike.

Meta is the purest case. Advertising is about 98% of its revenue, and its Family of Apps – Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger – earned $102.5 billion of operating income in 2025. Everything else Meta does, from its AI labs to its data centres, is funded by that one engine.

Alphabet is the central case. In 2025, Google Services earned $139.4 billion of operating income against $13.9 billion for Google Cloud. Services includes subscriptions, devices and the Play store, but its core is advertising across Search, YouTube and the partner network. Cloud is growing fast and is profitable, but last year Services earned about ten dollars for every dollar Cloud earned.

Amazon is the different case. AWS earned $45.6 billion of Amazon’s $80 billion operating income in 2025, about 57%. Advertising brought in $68.6 billion of revenue, at margins widely believed to rival AWS, but Amazon does not disclose its advertising profit. Amazon illustrates diversification better than it illustrates advertising dependence.

Figure 2. Where the profits came from: 2025 operating income by segment

One concession belongs at the start. Microsoft, the second-largest cloud provider and one of the largest AI spenders of all, is not an advertising business. Its build-out rests on enterprise software and cloud. So the claim is not that advertising funds all of AI. The claim is that advertising funds the ad-funded AI builders: Alphabet and Meta almost entirely, Amazon in part. Remove Amazon and the pattern sharpens rather than weakens.

The clean case: Alphabet and Meta alone. Capital expenditure absorbed 34% of their combined operating cash flow in 2023, 41% in 2024 and 57% in 2025. Their 2026 guidance of about $340 billion is roughly 120% of the $281 billion of operating cash they generated in 2025.

Two cautions keep the argument straight. Revenue is not profit, and profit is not cash. Advertising revenue measures the toll collected; operating cash flow measures what is available to spend. Measured either way, the conclusion holds: much of the money building the AI economy has come from businesses paying to reach customers. And when a build-out outgrows the engine that funds it, the funding question leaves the income statement and enters the capital markets.

2 From Surplus to Capital Markets

For two decades, the advertising giants financed their futures out of surplus. Search and social generated more cash than even their ambitions could absorb. For most of the past decade the excess went back to shareholders through buybacks, joined in 2024 by dividends. The model was simple: earn from advertising, invest what the business needs, return the rest.

In 2026 that model reached its limit. In the third quarter, Meta’s capital spending of $34.9 billion exceeded the $32.8 billion its operations generated, and its quarterly free cash flow turned negative for the first time since its 2012 listing (results). Meta repurchased no stock in the first nine months of the year, against $26.2 billion a year earlier. Alphabet’s free cash flow turned negative in the second and third quarters, and its trailing twelve-month figure fell 73% to $19.7 billion. Amazon’s trailing twelve-month free cash flow went negative in the middle of the year and had reached an outflow of $42.4 billion by the end of September.

None of these companies has run out of money. Meta’s free cash flow for the first nine months was still positive, at about $11 billion, and all three hold large cash balances. The change is at the margin, and it is structural rather than quarterly: investment has begun to outrun internally generated surplus, and the companies are supplementing operating cash with debt, equity and long-term commitments.

The equity raises need careful reading. In June 2026, Alphabet announced an equity raise with a headline value of $84.75 billion, and its parts served different purposes. About $35 billion of underwritten common and mandatory convertible preferred stock, together with a $10 billion private placement with Berkshire Hathaway, was raised for general corporate purposes, including AI infrastructure. A further $40 billion at-the-market programme, drawn over time, was designed primarily to change how Alphabet meets tax obligations on employee equity awards, and should not be counted as AI funding. In October, Meta priced $37.5 billion of stock: $25 billion of common shares through forward sales, whose proceeds arrive on settlement by November 2027, and $12.5 billion of mandatory convertible preferred. A further programme of up to $60 billion from 2027 is contemplated, not committed.

The cash in hand is therefore smaller than the headlines. But it answers the question that matters: does the market value of these companies now help pay for their AI? At the margin, it does.

For twenty years, advertising paid for the future out of surplus. In 2026, it began to lean on the share price as well.

The mechanism is indirect rather than mechanical. A market capitalisation does not pour concrete or buy chips. But once internal cash runs short, the share price sets how much of the company must be sold to raise each dollar, and the credit markets price their confidence in future cash flows. That confidence still rests on the advertising franchise. On 29 October 2026, the day after Alphabet reported slower Search growth alongside a doubling of Cloud revenue, it lost close to $500 billion of market value, the worst day in its history. Investors value Alphabet as an advertising business building a cloud business, not the reverse.

This creates a loop worth naming. Advertising profits support market value. Market value makes capital available at scale and at a tolerable cost. Capital funds AI infrastructure. AI improves ad targeting and creates new businesses. Better ads support advertising profits.

Figure 3. The reflexive funding loop behind the ad-funded AI builders

George Soros called loops like this reflexive: perception and reality reinforce each other. They compound on the way up. They are tested on the way down, because a weaker advertising engine would lower market value, raise the cost of capital and slow the very investment meant to replace it.

The loop ends only when AI can pay for itself, and that has three stages. Revenue validation asks whether customers pay meaningful sums for AI services; they do. Operating profitability asks whether those services cover their running costs; Google Cloud’s segment profit says yes for one of them, though segment figures leave out shared AI research costs carried at the corporate level. Capital independence asks whether AI generates enough cash to fund its own maintenance, chip replacement and growth without leaning on the old franchise. Nobody has reached that stage. Accelerators wear out within a few years, depreciation compounds, and an AI business can show rising revenue and operating profit while still needing outside capital to grow. Amazon makes the point: AWS earned $17.8 billion of operating income in the third quarter of 2026 alone, while the company as a whole ran a trailing free cash outflow of $42.4 billion. Until capital independence arrives, the advertising engine remains the guarantor.

If advertising is the sponsor, the next question follows. Who pays the advertising bill?

3 The Bill Behind the Profits

Every advertising dollar is a cost line in some other company’s profit and loss account. The sponsor of the AI revolution is, in the end, the world’s brands: retailers, banks, airlines, consumer goods makers, direct-to-consumer start-ups. Most of what they buy is what the invoice says – introductions to strangers, and demand that would not otherwise exist. But part of what they buy is stranger. It is access to people they already know.

Consider how it happens. A customer buys from a retailer. The retailer holds her email address, her mobile number and her purchase history. Over the following months its emails go unopened, its offers blur into the inbox, and its systems eventually mark her as unresponsive. Six months later she searches for the category, clicks a paid listing and buys again. The advertising dashboard records a conversion. The profit and loss account tells a different story: the brand paid a platform to restore a relationship it already possessed.

The pattern runs across the stack: search ads bought on the brand’s own name, retargeting of past visitors, and “new customer” campaigns whose audiences quietly overlap the customer file. The cause is the same each time. Attention in owned channels decays, and the only scalable way back is paid reach.

Not all of this is waste, and the distinction matters. Spend on known customers falls into three tiers. The first is the pool worth investigating: spend that reaches people the brand already knows. Call it potential AdWaste exposure – measurable, probably substantial, and not wasteful in itself. The second is spend that is not incremental, because the customer would have bought anyway. The third is avoidable reacquisition: spend that worked, but that an owned channel kept warm could have matched far more cheaply. Only the second and third are economic waste, and only a controlled test can verify them: a holdout group that receives no contact, compared with the paid route and the owned route.

Figure 4. Exposure is not waste: three tiers of spend on known customers

The platforms have a fair rebuttal. Knowing a customer’s email address is not the same as having an effective, free route to her. A lapsed customer who ignores email may respond to a search ad, and paying for that response can be rational.

The evidence supports the concern without settling its size. A field experiment at eBay, by Thomas Blake, Chris Nosko and Steven Tadelis, found that paid search on eBay’s own brand name produced no measurable short-term benefit, because shoppers simply arrived through the free link below the ad. Returns from other paid search came mainly from infrequent users; frequent users who already knew eBay were barely influenced. On the other side, an analysis of 640 Meta incrementality experiments by the measurement firm Haus found that Meta lifted brands’ primary results by 19% on average, with 65–70% of that impact coming from new customers. That is real acquisition. It also means roughly a third of Meta’s incremental impact came from customers the brands already had – incremental, and therefore not waste, but a measure of how much paid media is spent on people already known.

Nobody knows the size of the wasteful slice, and the reason is structural. Each system measures the job it was built to do. Adtech reports conversions. Martech reports engagement. The agency reports media efficiency. Nobody owns the question that sits between them: was this customer new to the company? The number that should exist is what I call REACQ% – the share of customers that paid channels report as new who were already in the brand’s database before the paid touch. It is a count of people, not a split of spend. It is a warning light, not a verdict: it shows where to look, and the holdout test shows how much of the spend was wasted.

My own estimate, developed across the NeoMarketing essays, is that AdWaste runs to about $500 billion a year globally. That is an estimate of the scale at stake, not a measurement; the real figure will emerge brand by brand, as REACQ% gets counted and tested. Even a modest fraction of it is a material share of the revenue the AI builders collect.

Part of the money building frontier AI is a tax on forgetting: brands paying to rent back customers they already own.

That tax does not sit idle. It is now funding the systems that will reshape how customers are found.

4 The Reinvention Paradox

The paradox of the AI build-out is that it strengthens the advertising engine before it threatens it.

The strengthening comes first. AI improves targeting, creative, bidding and recommendations. Meta’s case for its capital spending rests largely on advertising performance: better models put more relevant ads before more engaged users, and advertisers pay more for them. For brands, the toll becomes more productive, which also makes it harder to escape.

The threat follows. AI answers reduce the clicks that search advertising was built to sell. Agents acting for consumers do not see banners. Discovery shifts from results pages and feeds to conversations and delegated decisions. A question answered is a click not sold, unless the answer itself carries a sponsor.

Three futures follow from this tension.

Future What happens
1. Advertising finances the transition AI lifts the old engine while cloud and AI services scale. The incumbents cross from one profit pool to the next on their own cash and credit.
2. The old engine weakens first Discovery moves into AI answers and agents faster than it can be monetised. Earnings disappoint, capital gets dearer, and the build-out slows.
3. The toll is reinvented Agent gateways charge brands for recommendation, visibility and transactions. The old toll fades and a new one replaces it, often collected by the same companies.

The third future is the most consequential, and on today’s trajectory the most likely – though not inevitable. Gatekeeper rents rarely disappear; they migrate. Classified advertising moved from newspapers to search. Attention moved from portals to social feeds. Each time, whoever controlled the moment of choice found a way to charge for access to it. If agents become the moment of choice, the companies best placed to run them are those that already own the models, the distribution, the identity graphs and the advertiser relationships.

Much depends on whom the agents serve. A platform-controlled agent can monetise recommendations, placement and transactions. A customer-aligned agent, paid for by subscription, could refuse sponsored recommendations and optimise for its user alone. Will agents become the next advertising gatekeepers, or the first effective guardians against them? The answer is open, and few commercial questions this decade matter more.

Either way, two loops are already visible. The first is the incumbent loop: advertising profits fund AI capital, AI produces better products and new businesses, and those strengthen the profit engines. The second is the toll-payer’s loop: brands lose direct attention, re-buy customers through paid advertising, that revenue helps fund AI, and AI builds more powerful gateways to customers – deepening the dependence that started the cycle. Its magnitude remains a hypothesis. Its direction is the point.

Figure 5. Two loops: the incumbent’s and the toll-payer’s

Brands may be helping finance the intelligence that will decide which brands their customers discover, consider and buy from tomorrow.

There is a deeper contest inside the paradox. AI is being put to work in two economies with opposite incentives. In one, platforms use AI to rent attention: sharper targeting, better recommendations, higher ad yield. The objective is to maximise the value of paid access. In the other, brands use AI to earn attention: relevant communication between purchases, better service, retention and recovery through direct relationships. The objective is to minimise the need to buy access again. Both draw on the same improving capabilities. One makes the advertising auction more effective; the other makes some of those auctions unnecessary.

The next great contest in marketing may be between AI that makes advertising more valuable and AI that makes advertising less necessary.

Better AI targeting is therefore not automatically a victory for brands. It can raise short-term returns while leaving the underlying dependence on paid access intact. Which economy a given brand ends up in depends on what it does next.

5 Lessons for the Gatekeepers and the Toll-Payers

Step back from advertising and the story carries lessons for any business with a profitable core and an expensive future.

For every business with a cash engine

Every moat has a payer. Behind every cash cow is a customer paying more than they would in a more contestable market, or paying for something they could have had more cheaply. The first strategic question about any franchise is who funds it, and whether they can stop.

Cross-subsidies are fragile. For decades, newspaper classifieds paid for newsrooms. Readers believed they were paying for journalism; the economics said otherwise. When classifieds moved online, journalism did not become less valuable, but it lost its sponsor, and newsrooms shrank. Any business whose future is funded by a single profit pool should know exactly how that pool could dry up.

Beta can fund Alpha, but Alpha must earn the right to finance itself. Protecting the base business creates the cash and stability to build the next one. Until the new business reaches capital independence, it is an expensive experiment funded by yesterday’s advantage, and its funding is only as secure as that advantage.

Surplus and dilution are different kinds of freedom. A company that funds its future from earned profit controls its own pace; this is the idea behind what I have called the Proficorn. A company that funds its future through its share price depends on a story staying intact. The advertising giants have moved, at the margin, from the first condition towards the second.

For the businesses paying the toll

Never pay twice. The first move is measurement. Count how many of the customers your paid channels call new were already in your database, then use holdout tests to find out how many of those purchases the ads caused. Until both numbers exist, every acquisition budget hides a reacquisition bill.

Owned attention is the asset the toll taxes. An email address is not an audience; it is permission to earn one. Every relationship kept warm in an owned channel is one the brand never has to buy back, and AI now makes daily, individual, relevant engagement affordable in a way it was not three years ago.

Agent-mediated discovery raises the stakes. If agents increasingly decide what customers see, a direct relationship may be the only access to a customer that a brand does not have to rent. A customer who hears from a brand directly is a customer whose choices an intermediary does not fully control.

This is the agenda I have been developing under the name NeoMarketing: measure what you pay to re-buy, earn attention daily rather than renting it back, and pay vendors for the outcomes they deliver. I have set out parts of it in The Profit You Already Own, Every Business Has a Strait and From Rented to Owned. It remains an argument to be proved in practice. But the question it asks has grown larger than marketing efficiency, because the toll brands pay is now financing the gateways they will have to pass through.

What would prove this wrong

  1. Reacquisition turns out to be a small share of platform revenue once REACQ% is counted and tested brand by brand.
  2. AI makes paid retargeting so effective that it becomes the cheapest route back to a lapsed customer, not an avoidable one.
  3. Cloud and AI businesses reach capital independence within two or three years, and advertising’s role in financing the build fades.
  4. Agents bypass owned channels entirely, which would weaken the case for owned relationships as the remedy.

Each of these is testable, and each will show up in the numbers within a few years. Until then, the pattern in the filings is plain.

The profits of one generation of gatekeepers are financing the next. The open question is who keeps the customer when they are done.