1
Commentary
A few days ago (Jan 25), Wall Street Journal had a story entitled “Wall Street Has Fallen Out of Love With Software Stocks” which began thus: “Software companies’ pitch to investors could use an upgrade. Once a favorite of Wall Street, software stocks have been sliding lately, with investors increasingly concerned about how the sector could be upended by their newest crush: artificial-intelligence companies. Rocked by the emergence of “vibe coding”—the practice of using AI tools to quickly produce apps and websites—software heavyweights Salesforce, Adobe and ServiceNow are all down at least 30% since the start of last year. An S&P index of small and midsize software stocks is also down more than 20% over that period, with declines accelerating this month after the introduction of Anthropic’s Claude Code, an AI tool that industry insiders have said can dramatically shrink the time it takes to build even complex software.” The story added: “In reality, few investors and analysts think that software companies will become obsolete in the foreseeable future. The more pressing risk is that it could become more difficult to increase revenue, as customers experiment with other options rather than paying more for the usual updates and add-ons, RBC’s [Rishi] Jaluria said.”
This was one in a series of such stories that I had come across in the past few weeks.
FT (Jan 21): ““Software is not at all about the code or about the technology. Software is about your domain knowledge,” said Thoma Bravo co-founder Orlando Bravo…The plunge in software valuations, driven by fear of an existential threat from artificial intelligence, is creating a “huge buying opportunity,” Orlando Bravo, the firm’s co-founder, told the FT [in Davos]… Bravo’s comments come after a plunge in software valuations in recent weeks. Software is one of the US stock market’s worst-performing sectors so far this year, with an index tracking the group down about 7 per cent over the past three weeks.”
Bloomberg (Jan 18): “All told, a group of software-as-a-service stocks tracked by Morgan Stanley is down 15% so far this year, following a drop of 11% in 2025. It’s the worst start to a year since 2022, according to data compiled by Bloomberg… The latest selloff has exacerbated an already yawning gap between the performance of software companies and other areas of the tech sector. Anxieties about competition from upstart AI services are overshadowing characteristics like hefty profit margins and recurring revenue that for years made the group attractive in the eyes of market pros.”
Sherwood (Jan 16): “The relentless slide in software stocks continues…The growing adoption of Claude Code, and more recently, the launch of Claude Cowork by Anthropic, has been an attention-grabbing moment as to the power of AI agents and how they can be housed and operated solely under one highly integrated user interface.”
Heise (Jan 22): “The sell-off can hardly be classified as more than an ordinary correction; the price losses since the beginning of the year alone seem more like they’re from a textbook for major stock market crashes. Salesforce, Adobe, and Oracle are all in double-digit losses in 2026. ServiceNow, Atlassian, and HubSpot are even losing 30, 40, 50 percent at times, as a price overview from Fiscal.ai on social media impressively illustrates. The narrative that has been playing out on Wall Street trading desks for months is: “AI eats software.”…If autonomous AI agents handle tasks in the future that used to require entire corporate departments, why pay for dozens of Salesforce or Workday licenses? If AI reviews, formulates, and closes contracts, what’s the need for widespread DocuSign subscriptions? And if generative image and design models deliver in seconds what teams of graphic designers used to do – how many Photoshop licenses does a company need from Adobe then? Investors’ fear: productivity explodes, but software providers’ revenues implode. AI is celebrated, but it could prove to be pure poison for the seat economy.”
CTech (Jan 25): “Software companies once beloved by investors, from Silicon Valley to Wall Street, are fading as talk of the “death of SaaS” gains momentum. Until recently, much of the threat seemed to come from a handful of trendy vibe-coding startups, platforms that allow non-programmers to build simple applications using verbal commands…As AI agents commoditize software, companies such as Wix, monday and Nice confront a forced reinvention of growth, pricing and value.”
Jason Lemkin: “Traditional B2B software and SaaS is under assault. The leaders are all still growing, but in most cases slower than ever. Stock prices are under intense pressure in 2026 for anyone not growing > 20% or more.” He listed six threat vectors: fewer seats, AI budget shift, slow teams, product decay, TAM trap, price increases. He added: “The question your customers are asking themselves: “Do I want to use this product, or do I have to use this product?” If the answer is “have to,” you’re living on borrowed time. Customers may stay because they are prisoners, or because you have their data. But they may no longer want to.”
About the capital shift to AI, Jason Lemkin wrote: “2025 saw over $225 billion deployed into AI startups—46% of all venture capital. Five companies alone (OpenAI, Scale AI, Anthropic, Project Prometheus, and xAI) raised $84 billion. That’s 20% of all VC funding in one year going to five companies.” He added: “The market is saying: we’ll pay up for the infrastructure that makes AI possible—and we’ll make those employees generationally wealthy—but we’re deeply skeptical that incumbent software can adapt fast enough… Private AI companies are getting 3-10x the multiples of public SaaS incumbents. The market is pricing in wholesale disruption of existing software categories.”
Rohan Paul commented on a Satya Nadella interview: “”Satya Nadela is basically describing the death of the traditional SaaS model. Explains the AI agentic future, and where the “value” lives. Because business logic is moving from the software application to the AI agents. Currently, you buy software for its specific features and rules. Nadella argues that in the future, software apps will essentially become dumb databases (“CRUD”) or simple tools. The AI Agent will hold all the intelligence, orchestration, and reasoning, simply updating the databases as needed. The software becomes a commodity; the AI becomes the “brain” and the worker.”
**
My thesis
The commentary above captures what’s happening. But most analysis stops at diagnosis. I want to push toward prescription.
B2B software isn’t in a cyclical dip — it’s being structurally repriced. The subscription model that powered two decades of compounding (seats, renewals, expansion) is now being squeezed by multiple forces at once: AI-driven capability deflation, seat compression, vendor sprawl backlash, budget reallocation to AI and security, and the rise of faster, leaner AI-native competitors. Public market sentiment is reflecting this shift, with investors openly asking whether AI changes what software is “worth.”
The conventional fixes — add AI features, cut costs, buy competitors — are necessary but not sufficient. They defend existing revenue; they don’t create new profit pools. The winners will add new revenue engines that align with value created and attention captured — not only with headcount and licences.
This series examines the crisis, its root causes, the inadequacy of conventional responses, and a new revenue playbook built on two additional engines: performance fees (outcomes-based revenue) and attention yield (monetising engagement, not seats). The final part provides an implementation framework — the two-track approach — for building new revenue streams without destroying what’s working.
Sources & Influences
This series draws on public commentary and reporting including Jason Lemkin (SaaStr), Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Bloomberg, Sherwood News, Heise, CTech, Gartner, Vertice, Zylo, Iconiq, and SemiAnalysis. Direct quotes are attributed in-text.
The interpretations, the “new revenue playbook” framework (performance fees + attention yield), and the two-track implementation model proposed in Parts 5–6 are my own, developed through work at Netcore and my writings.
As with my other writing, I combine my thinking with assistance from AI (Claude and ChatGPT).
2
The Crisis
The repricing signal: when recurring revenue stops feeling “inevitable”
For years, B2B software earned a premium because it looked like the closest thing public markets had to a perpetual motion machine: multi-year contracts, high gross margins, low churn, and expansion built on seat growth. That story hasn’t ended — but it has lost its certainty.
Over recent weeks and months, software has noticeably underperformed the broader tech indices. Several category-defining names — Salesforce, Adobe, ServiceNow, HubSpot, Atlassian, Workday, Intuit — have seen double-digit declines over short windows and meaningful drawdowns (30-50%+) from their peaks. The precise numbers will keep shifting, but the signal is stable: investors are pricing higher uncertainty into software’s future cash flows.
What’s different this time is not merely rates or rotation. It’s a narrative inversion: AI was supposed to be the accelerant for software. Instead, the market is treating AI as a potential solvent.
One quote captures the emotional turn perfectly: “The narrative has really shifted… Investors have gone from initially thinking that software companies could benefit from AI to asking, ‘Is AI just the death of software?'” — Rishi Jaluria, RBC Capital Markets [WSJ]
That single line is doing a lot of work. It doesn’t mean software disappears. It means the market is asking whether the traditional software bargain — “pay us forever for capability” — survives in a world where capability can be generated, copied, and embedded faster than ever.
The valuation collapse
The multiple compression has been brutal.
A basket of software-as-a-service stocks tracked by Morgan Stanley is now trading at roughly 18 times forward earnings — its cheapest level on record. The historical average over the past decade exceeded 55 times. That’s not a discount. That’s a fundamental repricing of what software companies are worth.
The reason software commanded lofty multiples was simple: subscription-based recurring revenue that you could extrapolate into the future almost forever. Customers got locked in. Switching costs were high. Growth was predictable.
“It is hard to know what multiple they should be trading at if they’re going up against AI agents that are running 24/7 and have the ability to complete tasks, with big projects getting done in a day.” — Bryan Wong, Osterweis Capital Management [Bloomberg]
The old certainties are gone. And so are the old valuations.
Meanwhile, AI-native companies — both foundation model providers and application-layer startups — are commanding multiples that make traditional SaaS look like deep value investing. Private AI companies are raising at 50-100x revenue while public software trades at 6-12x. The market is pricing in wholesale disruption.
The Claude Code moment
Fear becomes acute when a tool makes the abstract feel concrete.
Recent coverage around Anthropic’s Claude Code gave investors a vivid mental model: building software compresses from months to days for a widening set of use cases. Developers reported completing complex projects in a week that would have taken a year. Non-engineers built their first applications without ever learning to code.
“I cannot stress enough that Claude Code is the ChatGPT moment repeated. You must try it to understand… This is going to hurt a large part of the software industry.” — Doug O’Laughlin [SemiAnalysis]
You don’t need to believe every hyperbolic claim to accept the direction: the cost and time to produce good-enough software is falling sharply. That attacks the pricing umbrella for broad swathes of application software.
The divergence: public software vs. private AI
At the same time public software is getting hammered, private markets are pouring money into AI infrastructure and AI-native applications at valuations that imply massive future profit pools.
Foundation model companies have raised tens of billions at valuations that would have seemed absurd two years ago. Application-layer AI startups are reaching $100 million in annual recurring revenue in one to two years — versus five-plus years historically for traditional SaaS.
“We’re living through something we’ve never quite seen before in B2B software. It’s arguably the worst time in our history to be invested in public software stocks. And simultaneously, the best time in our history to be invested in private hot AI-fueled startup stocks.” — Jason Lemkin [SaaStr]
The exact valuations will change. The underlying divergence is what matters. Public markets are demanding proof. Private markets are funding possibility.
The core question
This is what the market is now forcing on every B2B software company:
If AI can increasingly do what your product does — or enable customers to assemble substitutes — what exactly are customers paying you for, and why will that payment scale?
Understanding why this is happening structurally — beyond “AI fear” — is essential.
My thesis in brief: If seats compress, software needs new revenue primitives — not just new features. I see two: outcome-tied fees (paying for measurable improvement, not capability) and attention yield (monetising engagement, not headcount). The rest of this series explains why conventional responses fall short, and how to build these new engines without destroying what’s working.
3
Root Causes
Six compounding pressures (only one is “AI competition”)
Jason Lemkin’s recent SaaStr analysis identified six threat vectors attacking traditional B2B software. I want to build on his framework — not just list the pressures, but explore why they compound, and what that compounding means for revenue strategy. The forces don’t operate independently; they reinforce each other in ways that make “add AI features” insufficient as a response.
The temptation is to treat the current sell-off as sentiment that will mean-revert. That’s dangerous. B2B software faces multiple converging pressures — only one is direct AI competition. The others are economic and organisational shifts that would be squeezing the sector even if ChatGPT had never launched.
My lens: from threat vectors to revenue architecture

The threat vectors are real. But diagnosing pressures isn’t the same as prescribing solutions. Most commentary stops at “software is under pressure” or “add AI features.” I want to push further: if the unit economics of seats are breaking down, what new units of value can software companies sell?
Three shifts matter most for revenue strategy:
- The CFO reversion. Enterprise spend is shifting from “experiments” to “guarantees.” Risk transfer becomes the product. Outcome-based pricing isn’t just attractive — it’s what procurement increasingly demands. CFOs are tired of paying for capability without accountability.
- The orchestration migration. As Satya Nadella suggests, apps may become systems of record while AI agents handle orchestration and reasoning. If that’s true, value migrates to measurement, guarantees, and the data layer — not workflows and UIs.
- The attention opportunity. B2B software generates enormous engagement that’s never been monetised. Email platforms see billions of opens daily. Collaboration tools capture hours of attention. That’s a latent revenue pool waiting to be unlocked — if companies can move beyond the “ads are beneath us” mindset.
With that lens, let’s examine the six pressures — and what each implies for revenue architecture.
- Seat growth is slowing (and AI amplifies the slowdown)
Per-user pricing won’t vanish overnight — even AI-native darlings like Cursor and Anthropic charge per seat. But the seat-growth engine is no longer the dependable escalator it was. The unit of pricing may survive; the expansion dynamic has stalled.
Companies from Workday on down are seeing customers commit to lower headcount on renewals. As Workday CEO Carl Eschenbach acknowledged [SaaStr]: “We are seeing customers committing to lower headcount levels on renewals compared to what we had expected. We expect these dynamics to persist in the near term.”
Some of this is simply headcount slowdown. Tech hiring has flattened. Some companies are holding headcount flat for years while still growing revenue significantly — proof that productivity gains are real and that the old “more employees = more seats” equation is breaking.
AI agents accelerate the compression. The relationship isn’t linear or predictable, but every autonomous agent handling work previously done by humans creates downward pressure on seat counts. The maths works against traditional expansion models.
The data tells the story. Net revenue retention at leading SaaS companies has flattened or declined. Some companies are seeing enterprise customer counts actually decline while still generating strong free cash flow — the classic signs of harvest mode. Revenue holds; growth stalls.
Revenue implication: If seats don’t expand, you need revenue that scales with transactions or outcomes, not headcount. This is the core case for performance-based pricing.
In martech specifically, the seat question is even more acute: marketing teams are shrinking while marketing automation demands grow. The gap is being filled by agents, not hires. A platform priced per marketer faces structural headwinds; a platform priced per incremental sale does not.
- SaaS sprawl backlash and “SaaS inflation”
Buyers are drowning in tools — and increasingly aware that many of those tools creep up in price annually.
SaaS prices have been rising at roughly four to five times general inflation. The average enterprise now spends significantly more per employee on SaaS than just two years ago. Analysis suggests that a substantial majority of some vendors’ recent growth came from price increases, not new customers.
As Gartner’s John-David Lovelock observed [SaaStr]: “The cost of software is going up and both the cost of features and functionality is going up as well thanks to GenAI.”
This creates a vicious cycle. Price increases eat incremental budget. Reduced budget means less room for new purchases. Less expansion pressures vendors to raise prices again. The spiral continues until something breaks.
Most IT budget uplifts are being absorbed by renewals, security posture, and foundational AI commitments. There’s less discretionary room for “yet another tool” — and even less appetite for price increases justified by AI features users didn’t ask for.
Revenue implication: The procurement trap is real. Vendor consolidation pressure makes “incremental modules” harder to sell than “revenue engines.” If you’re asking for more budget, you need to show you’re generating budget — through measurable outcomes or cost offsets. Pure capability expansion hits a ceiling.
- The AI + security budget gravity well
Whether you love it or hate it, a growing share of incremental IT spend is being pulled into foundation models, AI tooling, and security posture.
Enterprise leaders expect dramatic growth in LLM budgets over the next year. AI has graduated from experiment to core operating expense. The majority of AI use cases are now purchased rather than built internally.
Foundation model companies alone are generating tens of billions in combined annualised revenue — consuming a material share of all incremental IT budget.
As Jason Lemkin [SaaStr] put it bluntly: “If you’re not tapping into AI budget, you’re fighting for scraps.”
If you can’t articulate how you replace humans, dramatically augment humans, or enable the previously impossible — you’re competing for a shrinking pool of non-AI budget. The “incremental productivity improvement” pitch that worked for a decade now sounds quaint next to “we eliminated three roles.”
Revenue implication: Outcome-based pricing taps into AI budget naturally, because outcomes are what AI budget is for. A platform that guarantees measurable improvement competes for AI budget. A platform that offers “AI-powered features” without measurable impact competes for scraps.
- The efficiency gap: AI-native companies are faster and leaner
AI-native companies are showing startling revenue-per-employee figures and shipping velocity. They’re built around new production functions: smaller teams, higher leverage, faster iteration loops.
The efficiency gap is becoming a chasm. AI-native startups are averaging five to six times the revenue per employee of traditional mature SaaS. They’re reaching $100 million ARR in one to two years versus five-plus years historically.
When you can achieve the same scale with dramatically less capital and fewer people, you can move faster, experiment more, and capture market share while competitors are still in planning meetings.
The key point isn’t the precise number — it’s the magnitude of the gap. And it’s not just about headcount efficiency — it’s about iteration velocity. AI-native teams ship daily because they don’t have organisational antibodies resisting change. Traditional teams are still debating what to build while competitors are already measuring what works.
Revenue implication: Speed compounds. Companies that can prove value in 90 days will win deals over companies that need 12-month implementations. Outcome-based models force this discipline: you can’t charge for outcomes you haven’t delivered, so you’re incentivised to deliver fast. The pricing model becomes a forcing function for operational excellence.
- TAM traps and maturity
Some categories are simply maturing.
When expansion turns into harvesting — price per seat, margin maximisation — markets stop paying for “forever growth.” When management talks about “seat expansion” and “price per seat increases” instead of customer acquisition, you’re watching a company hit its TAM ceiling.
The warning signs are clear across the industry: revenue up, customers flat or down. Growth decelerating from 30%+ to single digits. Entire strategies centred on extracting more from existing customers rather than acquiring new ones.
Markets don’t fear collapse. They fear decades of mediocrity — the slow fade of a company that’s stopped growing but hasn’t yet died.
Revenue implication: TAM traps are category-specific, but the escape route is universal: find new units of value. If you’ve saturated seat expansion in your category, you need revenue streams that don’t depend on seats. Performance fees and attention yield are TAM-agnostic — they scale with customer success and engagement, not with headcount in a saturating category.
- The product experience gap
This is the most uncomfortable pressure to acknowledge.
AI-native products frequently feel magical in a way legacy SaaS does not. From Claude to the best AI-native applications, these products don’t just improve productivity. They create delight. Instantly.
The experience gap isn’t subjective. Chatting with data beats navigating via clicks. Natural language beats form fields. Getting an answer in seconds beats clicking through five screens. The interface paradigm has shifted, and products designed for the click-and-navigate era feel like using a fax machine.
When users can build functional apps in minutes or get meaningful output in seconds, the bar for what constitutes a “great product” has permanently shifted.
Revenue implication: Experience drives engagement. Engagement drives attention. Attention is monetisable. The companies that create delightful, habitual experiences have an asset they’re not exploiting: the attention surface. Meanwhile, companies with clunky experiences have neither the engagement to monetise nor the goodwill to raise prices.
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The meta-shift: where intelligence lives
Beneath all six pressures lies a deeper structural transformation.
Business logic is moving from the software application to AI agents. Today, you buy software for its specific features and rules. The application holds the intelligence. Tomorrow, software applications may become systems of record and CRUD (create, read, update, delete) layers — simple tools for storing and retrieving information — while AI agents hold all the intelligence, orchestration, and reasoning.
As Doug O’Laughlin wrote: “I believe that the future role of software will not have much ‘information processing’, i.e., analysis. Claude Code or Agent-Next will be doing the information synthesis, the GUI, and the workflow. That will be ephemeral and generated for the use at hand…Most SaaS companies today need to shift their business models to more closely resemble API-based models to align with the memory hierarchy of the future of software. Data’s safekeeping and longer-term storage are largely the role of software companies now, and they must learn to look much more like infrastructure software to be consumed by AI Agents. I believe that is what’s next.”
What becomes worthless in this world: faster workflows, better UIs, smoother integrations. All of that can be generated on demand.
What becomes valuable: persistent information, APIs, proprietary data — and the ability to prove outcomes and own attention. If the intelligence layer commoditises, the measurement layer and the engagement layer become the new sources of defensible value.
**
The compounding problem
The important conclusion: these forces compound.
Seat compression reduces expansion. Price hikes create backlash. AI budgets siphon incremental spend. AI-native speed widens competitive gaps. Mature categories saturate. Experience gaps accelerate switching intent. Each weakness exposes the others. Each pressure intensifies the rest.
A company facing one of these pressures can adapt. A company facing all six simultaneously — which is most of B2B software — needs more than incremental responses.
If that’s true, “add AI features” is necessary — but not sufficient. The question becomes: what is the industry doing about it.
4
What the Market Is Trying — And Why It Falls Short
Defence is not a revenue strategy
The industry is not asleep. Executives are responding. Boards are asking hard questions. Capital is being reallocated.
But most responses are defensive: they protect today’s revenue model rather than create tomorrow’s.
Response 1: “Add AI features”
The most common response is to bolt AI capabilities onto existing products. Copilots. Assistants. Agent add-ons. Generative features. Every enterprise software company now has an “AI strategy.”
The problem: adding AI doesn’t automatically change willingness-to-pay — especially if buyers believe AI features will commoditise and converge.
Even investors are noticing gaps between “AI messaging” and “AI monetisation.” Major vendors have touted AI adoption, but it hasn’t moved the revenue needle significantly. Some didn’t update AI-related measures in their earnings reports — a telling omission.
Adding features that customers expect but won’t pay more for is a treadmill, not a strategy. If AI features become table stakes — something every competitor offers — they don’t justify premium pricing.
Response 2: “Domain knowledge is our moat”
This is the Thoma Bravo argument — and it’s partly right. “Software is not at all about the code or about the technology. Software is about your domain knowledge. Most software companies know a specific vertical, a specific process, a specific function so well that there are three to five companies in the world that know it, and about 20 individuals in the world that really, really know it. That is the franchise. That is the value. That is what you cannot replicate.”
Orlando Bravo is right that payroll, compliance-heavy workflows, and regulated systems don’t evaporate overnight. Domain expertise is genuinely hard to replicate. Integration moats are real.
But this is primarily a defence of durability, not a plan for new revenue expansion under seat compression. Domain knowledge protects existing revenue; it doesn’t create new revenue streams. And foundation models are building domain knowledge faster than many expected.
Bravo himself acknowledged that companies without specialisation are “absolutely vulnerable.” The question is whether even specialised companies can grow when their core revenue model is under pressure.
Protecting the franchise isn’t the same as expanding it.
Response 3: Cost cutting and “efficient growth”
Faced with slowing growth, many software companies have turned to the efficiency playbook. Layoffs. Margin expansion. “Disciplined execution.”
Some companies are generating strong free cash flow even as revenue growth stalls. Management talks about operational efficiency and 50% margins.
This is harvest mode. It works — for a while. Cash flow remains strong. Investors focused on profitability may appreciate the discipline.
But cost-cutting is an anaesthetic, not a cure. You can’t cut your way to a new growth curve. Eventually, there’s nothing left to cut. And if your category’s pricing power is under pressure, efficiency alone becomes a slow glide path to irrelevance.
Response 4: Consolidation / M&A
Private equity sees opportunity in repriced assets. Thoma Bravo has raised tens of billions for software deals, calling the sell-off a “huge buying opportunity.”
The thesis is straightforward: buy beaten-down software companies at discounted valuations, optimise operations, extract cash flow, and eventually exit. Consolidation reduces competition and creates scale.
But consolidation isn’t innovation. It’s the same revenue model with fewer players. The PE playbook — optimise margins, reduce costs, raise prices — doesn’t solve the structural challenges. It just extends the harvest phase.
And even PE isn’t immune. Some Thoma Bravo deals have reportedly soured due to AI-related issues. Other major PE firms have cut software exposure or even shorted software debt over AI fears.
When the smartest money in the room is hedging its software bets, consolidation alone isn’t the answer.
Response 5: “Wait for the narrative to turn”
Some bulls argue that the sell-off is overdone. AI will ultimately be a tailwind for software, not a headwind. The total addressable market will expand. Incumbent advantages in distribution and data will prevail.
They may be right — eventually. But hope is not a strategy.
Even if public software rebounds, the underlying structural forces remain: agentic workflows, budget shifts, buyer fatigue, speed gaps. The structural changes don’t reverse on their own. Even if AI expands the total addressable market, there’s no guarantee incumbents will capture the expansion.
Response 6: “Foundation models will struggle to build business software”
This is the most sophisticated defence, articulated by Orlando Bravo in a Financial Times op-ed.
The argument: OpenAI and Anthropic face the same challenge as every tech giant before them. Building enterprise software from scratch requires decades of industry knowledge, thousands of integrations, deep understanding of regulations, and the trust of large enterprises. Code is easy. Domain knowledge is hard.
As Orlando Bravo said, “Companies like OpenAI trying to build business software face the same challenge as every tech giant before them: creating entire business systems from scratch. What’s hard is the decades of industry knowledge, thousands of existing connections to other software, deep understanding of industry-specific regulations and the built-up trust of large enterprises.”
This is reasonable. Foundation model companies would struggle to replicate what incumbents have built over decades.
But the argument assumes the competition is foundation models building business software from scratch. It ignores the possibility of foundation models partnering with nimbler players, or enabling customers to build their own solutions, or simply commoditising the intelligence layer while incumbents are stuck with legacy architectures.
More importantly, it’s a defensive posture. “They can’t beat us” is different from “here’s how we win.”
What’s missing
Notice what all these responses have in common: they focus on defending existing subscription revenue.
Almost everything starts with: “How do we defend subscriptions?”
The better question is: What new revenue engines can a software company add that don’t depend on seat expansion and don’t require endless price hikes?
5
The New Revenue Playbook
Beyond subscriptions: two additional revenue engines
If subscriptions are under assault, what comes next?
Not “better subscriptions.” Not subscriptions with AI features. Entirely new revenue streams that align payment with value delivered.
This is the heart of the thesis — and it’s strongest when framed as additive, not as a wholesale replacement for subscriptions.
Think of the modern B2B software company as needing three revenue modes, of which two are new:
- Subscription (stability — the foundation that funds everything)
- Performance / outcomes (upside aligned to value created)
- Attention / ecosystem yield (monetise engagement and distribution, not headcount)

Why these new engines?
Both “new engines” share four properties that the market is now rewarding:
| Property |
What it means |
| Variable |
Scales with customer success or engagement |
| Aligned |
Paid when value is realised |
| Non-linear |
Can grow without seats |
| Defensible |
Requires measurement, data, network, or workflow position |
These properties escape the forces crushing traditional subscriptions. They don’t depend on headcount growth. They don’t require price increases that alienate customers. They align vendor and customer incentives. And they create moats that generic AI models can’t easily replicate.
Engine #1: Performance fees (outcomes-based revenue)
Principle: Stop charging only for capability. Charge for measurable improvement.
This isn’t new as an idea — consultancies and hedge funds have done it for decades. But software has historically avoided it because subscriptions are easier to forecast.
The point now is: forecastability is being repriced anyway. And alignment is becoming a competitive advantage.
The structure (borrowing from finance)
The terminology comes from hedge fund economics, but the application is direct:
- Beta is the baseline — what would have happened anyway. In finance, beta is market return; in outcome-based software pricing, beta is the customer’s performance without your intervention. This isn’t a fee; it’s the benchmark against which value is measured.
- Alpha is the outperformance — the incremental improvement above beta. The vendor charges a percentage of this uplift. No uplift, no payment. This is pure alignment: you only earn when you create measurable value.
- Carry is the long-tail participation — if Alpha persists over time, the vendor continues to share in the sustained improvement. This rewards durable impact, not one-time spikes.
A practical performance fee structure looks like this:
| Component |
What it means |
| Beta (Baseline) |
The counterfactual — what performance would have been without intervention. This is the measurement benchmark, not a fee. |
| Alpha (Performance fee) |
% of incremental value delivered above Beta. The vendor only earns when they create measurable uplift. |
| Carry (Long-tail share) |
If Alpha persists over time, the vendor continues to participate in sustained improvement. |

This does three useful things simultaneously:
- Makes the CFO feel safer. “Pay when it works” removes risk from the customer’s perspective. No uplift means minimal payment. This is a compelling proposition for finance leaders tired of paying for capabilities they’re not sure deliver value.
- Forces measurement rigour. Outcome pricing requires instrumentation, data trust, customer governance, and a shared definition of “incremental.” This rigour becomes a competitive advantage — and a moat.
- Escapes seat compression. Revenue is tied to transactions or outcomes, not headcount. If AI reduces the humans involved, the vendor still gets paid on results.
I’ve explored this extensively in my NeoMarketing essays, where the application to martech is direct: performance fees linked to incremental sales generated, with measurement built into the channel infrastructure. But the model generalises. Any B2B software category with measurable customer outcomes can adopt this structure.
Where it applies (beyond martech)
Performance fee models can work across B2B software wherever outcomes are measurable:
| Vertical |
Traditional Model |
Performance Fee Model |
| Sales Tech |
Per-seat CRM |
% of pipeline conversion uplift |
| HR Tech |
Per-employee platform fee |
% of retention improvement or hiring cost reduction |
| Fintech (B2B) |
Platform fee |
% of fraud prevented or collections improved |
| Supply Chain |
Per-user licence |
% of cost savings or delivery improvement |
| Customer Support |
Per-agent pricing |
% of containment rate improvement or CSAT uplift |
| DevOps |
Per-seat IDE |
% of deployment velocity improvement or incident reduction |
The common thread: tie revenue to outcomes that customers actually care about, not capabilities they may or may not use.
The key requirement
Outcome pricing is not a pricing page change — it’s an operating model.
It requires:
- Instrumentation (measuring what matters)
- Data trust (agreeing on the source of truth)
- Customer governance (pre-agreed methodology)
- Attribution clarity (defining what’s “incremental”)
- Control groups or credible quasi-experiments (proving causation)
This is hard. That’s why it’s defensible.
Engine #2: Attention yield (ads, partnerships, network monetisation)
This is the more contrarian piece — and therefore the more differentiating, if executed correctly.
Principle: If your product creates repeat engagement for a valuable audience, you can monetise the surface area — not by annoying users, but by enabling relevant, additive partner value.
The insight
Consumer platforms have understood attention economics for decades. Google and Meta built trillion-dollar businesses on attention monetisation.
But B2B software has traditionally ignored this revenue stream, viewing advertising as somehow beneath enterprise dignity. That’s changing. As subscription growth stalls, B2B companies are discovering that engaged user bases are valuable assets that can be monetised in multiple ways.
The cleanest framing: Software that owns attention can earn yield.
Yield can come from ads, partnerships, referrals, and transactions. The monetisation must be consent-driven, transparent, and value-adding.
In other words: don’t copy consumer adtech. Create utility-aligned monetisation.
Where the attention surface exists
Most B2B software never earns the right to monetise attention because users don’t choose to spend time there. But some categories do:
| Surface |
Why attention exists |
| Communication platforms |
Daily, habitual engagement |
| Marketplaces and networks |
Discovery and transaction intent |
| High-frequency dashboards |
Operational necessity creates regular visits |
| Inbox-like environments |
Daily attention is already there |
| Collaboration tools |
Team workflows create repeated engagement |
How it works
Software that engages end-users creates an “attention surface.” That attention can be monetised through:
- Sponsored content from complementary vendors
- Partner revenue shares for referrals and transactions
- Contextual recommendations that add value
- Cooperative advertising networks where brands reach customers through each other’s engaged channels
The economics can be compelling. Instead of customers paying platform fees, the attention they generate subsidises their costs — while creating new revenue for the software provider.
The inbox example
Consider email — one of the few places where attention is both habitual and measurable.
Traditional model: brand pays email service provider per email sent, regardless of engagement.
Attention-based model: daily value-driven emails that customers actually want to open, with in-email transactions sponsored by complementary brands. The brand sending the email (publisher) earns revenue from the engaged attention. The brand reaching that audience (advertiser) pays for deterministic access — at a fraction of what they’d pay Google or Meta for probabilistic reach.
Both brands benefit. Attention is monetised. The network captures a share. This is the core of what I call NeoNet — a cooperative advertising layer built on authenticated engagement rather than probabilistic targeting. The economics favour everyone except the platforms currently extracting the reacquisition tax.
**
Why incumbents won’t copy easily
Even if these ideas sound straightforward, most incumbents struggle to execute because of structural barriers:
For performance fees:
- Sales compensation is built around ARR, not outcomes
- Finance teams dislike variable revenue until it becomes meaningful
- Product teams aren’t instrumented for causal measurement
- The shift requires confidence that the product actually delivers value — and willingness to stake revenue on that belief
For attention yield:
- “Ads” triggers cultural antibodies in B2B — even when it’s actually “partner yield”
- Engagement levels may not justify monetisation
- Network effects take time, and incumbents often have no incentive to start
- Different skill sets are required (media, partnerships, ad operations)
This is why the new engines require a distinct motion — not a side project for the existing team.
The moat: proprietary data and domain knowledge
Orlando Bravo is right that domain knowledge is the franchise. But he’s applying it defensively.
Applied offensively, domain knowledge becomes the foundation for new revenue models:
- Domain knowledge enables better outcome measurement. If you deeply understand a vertical, you know what “good” looks like. You can define baselines, measure uplift, and prove value in ways that generic AI models cannot.
- Proprietary data enables better targeting. If you have unique signals about customer behaviour, you can deliver more relevant recommendations and more valuable attention.
- Integration depth enables better execution. If you’re embedded in customer workflows, you can act on insights immediately.
The combination — proprietary data, domain knowledge, and new revenue models — creates defensible differentiation. Generic AI models can replicate features. They can’t replicate years of accumulated intelligence about specific verticals and customer behaviours.
The question for CEOs
A simple restatement:
The question isn’t “how do we defend subscriptions?”
It’s “what new profit pools can we add that scale with outcomes and attention?”
Now comes the hard part: execution without wrecking the core.
6
What B2B Software Companies Must Do
The two-track approach: protect the core, build the future
The biggest mistake companies make in moments like this is either:
- Freeze (“wait it out”), or
- Flail (a panicked “pivot” that scares customers and employees)
The right approach is a two-track operating system.
Why two tracks, not a pivot
The temptation in a crisis is dramatic action. Abandon subscriptions. Go all-in on outcomes. Transform the company.
This usually fails.
Subscriptions, for all their challenges, still generate predictable cash flow. That cash flow funds operations, pays salaries, and provides the runway to experiment. Abandoning it prematurely risks the entire company.
Existing customers chose you because of the current model. They have budgets allocated, contracts signed, workflows built. Suddenly changing the deal creates confusion and churn.
New models need time to prove. Performance fees require measurement infrastructure. Attention economics require engagement levels. Neither delivers revenue on day one. Betting everything on unproven models is reckless.
And the narrative matters. “We’re pivoting because our core business is failing” terrifies investors. “We’re building a second growth engine” inspires them.
The framing: Track 1 remains the compounding base. Track 2 is a deliberate build of new profit pools that escape seat compression. Add variable upside engines while there is still credibility, customers, and cash flow.

Track 1: Protect and modernise the core
Track 1 is the subscription engine. It funds everything.
Goals
- Reduce churn and contraction
- Improve product experience
- Use AI to lower cost-to-serve and increase value
- Tighten packaging so pricing feels earned
- Add AI features that justify (but don’t depend on expanding) current pricing
Metrics
| Metric |
What it measures |
| Gross retention |
Customer base stability |
| Net revenue retention |
Expansion vs. contraction |
| Logo churn |
Customer loss rate |
| Gross margin |
Operational efficiency |
| CAC payback |
Sales efficiency |
| Product usage health |
Real adoption, not vanity metrics |
Investment
The majority of current resources — 70-80%. Track 1’s job is to buy time and fund Track 2 experimentation.
Track 2: Build new revenue engines
Track 2 is not “innovation theatre.” It is a separate revenue motion with separate economics, skills, and success criteria.
Goals
- Prove outcome pricing in a tight set of pilots
- Build measurement credibility and repeatable playbooks
- Build (or plug into) an attention/yield network where the surface exists
- Convert pilots into a scalable revenue line with clear unit economics
Metrics
| Metric |
What it measures |
| Pilots launched |
Experimentation velocity |
| Pilot → contract conversion |
Model viability |
| Uplift distribution (median, p75, p90) |
Outcome quality — not just best case |
| Time-to-proof |
How fast you can show measurable value |
| Track 2 revenue as % of total |
Revenue diversification progress |
Investment
A dedicated allocation — 20-30% of resources — with a dedicated team.
**
Organisational design: the anti-antibody move
The most common mistake is letting the Track 1 team run Track 2.
It never works.
Track 1 teams are optimised for subscription metrics. They’re compensated on ARR. They’ve spent careers perfecting the current model. Asking them to cannibalise it creates impossible conflicts.
Organisational antibodies are real. New initiatives that threaten existing revenue face resistance at every level. Priorities shift back to the core business. Experiments get deprioritised. Track 2 dies a quiet death.
The solution: structural separation
| Dimension |
Track 1 |
Track 2 |
| Team |
Existing organisation |
Dedicated squad (startup-within) |
| Leader |
Current leadership |
Track 2 Lead with CEO visibility |
| Commercial motion |
Standard contracts, quotas |
Separate templates, legal, finance rules |
| Metrics |
ARR, NRR, churn |
Uplift, pilot conversion, Track 2 revenue |
| Compensation |
Standard quotas |
Tied to outcomes delivered / revenue realised |
| Culture |
Optimise and defend |
Experiment and prove |
The pilot programme: how to start without drama
Track 2 should start with pilots, not transformation.
Start with 3-5 pilots where:
- Baselines are measurable (you know current performance)
- The customer has executive sponsorship (champion who will advocate)
- The domain has clear value metrics (retention, conversion, cost savings)
- You can run controlled comparisons (treatment vs. control)
Pilot structure
| Element |
Specification |
| Duration |
90 days + measurement window |
| Scope |
10% of customer base in treatment, 10% in matched control |
| Methodology |
Pre-agreed measurement protocol |
| Success criteria |
Defined before starting |
A good pilot is designed to answer one question: Can we repeatedly create measurable value, and can we contract for it?
Kill criteria: intellectual honesty
Avoid the sunk cost fallacy. Define failure upfront.
Track 2 should be reassessed if:
- Fewer than 30% of pilots show meaningful uplift
- Average uplift falls below the threshold that justifies the economics
- Track 1 materially suffers due to distraction
- 12 months pass without repeatable proof
Write these criteria down before starting. Revisit them at each gate. Be willing to kill what isn’t working.
The 90-day starting point
For companies ready to begin:
Weeks 1-2:
- Identify Track 2 leader (credibility, autonomy, CEO access)
- Define first pilot candidates from existing customers
- Draft measurement methodology
Weeks 3-4:
- Assemble core team (5-10 people, dedicated full-time)
- Sign 3-5 pilot agreements
- Establish baseline metrics
Weeks 5-8:
- Build/configure measurement infrastructure
- Deploy initial interventions
- Begin data collection
Weeks 9-12:
- First results emerging
- Iterate based on early learnings
- Expand to additional pilots if signals positive
Week 13+:
- Full measurement cycle
- Statistical significance achieved
- Decision: scale, iterate, or kill
- Board review
The investor narrative
Your outward story is not “we’re pivoting.” It’s: “We’re building a second growth engine.
Track 1 continues to deliver predictable subscription revenue and cash flow. We’re maintaining the business, adding AI capabilities, and extracting efficiency gains. This is the foundation.
Track 2 is capturing new profit pools through outcome-based pricing and attention economics. These revenue streams escape seat-based compression because they’re tied to value delivered, not headcount. They align our incentives with our customers’ success. And they position us for growth in the AI era.
We’re running both tracks in parallel. Track 1 funds the business. Track 2 builds the future. This isn’t a pivot — it’s diversification. We’re adding variable upside engines while we still have credibility, customers, and cash flow.”
What not to say:
- “We’re pivoting” (signals desperation)
- “Subscriptions are dead” (terrifies existing customers)
- “We’ll figure out the model later” (signals no plan)
The window is closing
The software companies that win the AI era won’t be the ones who cling longest to the old model.
They’ll be the ones who:
- Keep the subscription engine healthy, and
- Build new engines that monetise value delivered and attention earned
Enterprise software spending will exceed $1.4 trillion this year. Global IT spending will surpass $6 trillion. The market is growing. The opportunity is enormous.
The question is whether you’re positioned to capture it — or watching it flow to companies that figured this out faster.
The window is 18-24 months. After that, the market will reprice based on execution, not fear. Companies that have proven new revenue models will be rewarded. Companies that haven’t will face further compression.
The time to start is now.
**
Conclusion: The Revenue Imperative
B2B software’s crisis is real, structural, and accelerating.
The six threat vectors — seat slowdown, price increase backlash, AI budget shift, efficiency gaps, TAM traps, and product experience gaps — compound each other. The conventional responses — AI features, domain knowledge, cost cuts, consolidation — are defensive. They protect what exists. They don’t create what’s needed.
What’s needed is a new revenue playbook.
Performance fees that tie vendor revenue to customer outcomes. Attention economics that monetise engagement rather than headcount. New profit pools that escape seat-based compression.
The implementation requires a two-track approach. Track 1 maintains the subscription base, generates cash flow, and buys time. Track 2 builds new revenue streams, proves new models, and creates the future.
The question isn’t whether B2B software will change. It’s whether your company will lead the change or be changed by it.